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SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW UNDER

NEPA

On June 24, 1975, the United States Supreme Court rendered
a decision' in its first substantive review of the provisions of the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA).2 Holding

that the procedural requirements imposed by NEPA had been
fully complied with by the Interstate Commerce Commission
(ICC) during its consideration of the rate increases proposed by
the nation's railroads, the Court reversed the decision of the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia3 and
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of San Diego School of Law; B.S., Russell
Sage College; J.D., Albany Law School; LL.M., George Washington University.
1. Aberdeen & R.R.R. v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures
(SCRAP), [hereinafter cited as United States v. SCRAP] 95 S. Ct. 23' 3 (1975). This case
had previously reached the Supreme Court on the issue of SCRAP's standing to challenge
the railroads' rate increases. See United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-74 (1971).
3. SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd, United States
v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct. 2336 (1975).
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may have cast well-established case law interpreting the decisionmaking process mandated by NEPA into a state of confusion.
Part I of this article analyzes the Supreme Court decision
with an examination of how the law interpreting NEPA has been
changed, while Part II focuses on the substantive mandate of
NEPA by assessing the methods through which judicial review of
agency decisions on the merits can be achieved.
PART ONE
I.

UNITED STATES V. STUDENTS CHALLENGING REGULATORY AGENCY
PROCEDURES

(SCRAP)

Under scrutiny in United States v. Students Challenging
Regulatory Agency Procedures4 (SCRAP) was the ICC's compliance with the procedures mandated by NEPA for incorporation
of environmental considerations into the agency's general revenue
proceeding. The decisionmaking process to be followed by federal
agencies in considering environmental factors is set forth in section 102 of NEPA.5 Essentially, section 102 requires all agencies
4. 95 S. Ct. 2336 (1975). SCRAP is an unincorporated association of law students
formed to work for improvement in the quality of the environment.
5. NEPA § 102, 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (1971) provides in part:
The Congress authorizes and directs that, to the fullest extent possible: (1) the
policies, regulations, and public laws of the United States shall be interpreted
and administered in accordance with the policies set forth in this chapter, and
(2) all agencies of the Federal Government shall(A) utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the
environmental design arts in planning and in decisionmaking which
may have an impact on man's environment;
(B) identify and develop methods and procedures, in consultation
with the Council on Environmental Quality established by subchapter
II of this chapter, which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical
considerations;
(C) include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the responsible
official on(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of longterm productivity, and
(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/2

2

Nolan: The National Environmental Policy Act after United States v. Scra

National Environmental Policy Act
of the federal government to submit an environmental impact
statement with every proposal for "major federal action" significantly affecting the quality of the human environment.
Since this case has a lengthy history and involves questions
of ICC ratemaking procedures, a brief summary of the important
events and relevant ICC procedures is necessary to fully understand the issues presented to the Supreme Court.
II.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to section 15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act,6
unless the ICC decides that an investigation into the lawfulness
of a proposed rate increase is advisable and that the rates should
be suspended pending such investigation, tariff changes filed by
carriers go into effect automatically. The increase initiated by a
railroad may relate to only a single commodity or to all or substantially all rates. Proceedings in which the ICC decides whether
to question an across-the-board rate increase have become known
as general revenue proceedings.
Arguing that costs had increased sharply while profits had
decreased, the nation's railroads in December, 1971, proposed to
file tariffs which would increase freight rates by 2.5 percent. The
across-the-board "surcharge," referred to as temporary, was to be
supplanted later by a larger, somewhat selective rate increase
filing. Having determined that the railroads had a critical need
for revenue, the ICC did not exercise its power to suspend the
proposed rate increases and on February 5, 1972, the surcharge
went into effect.
March 17, 1972 marked the date of the filing of the permanent selective rate increases by the railroads. An across-the-board
average increase of 4.1 percent over the original rates was to be
effected by the selective increases. Pursuant to ICC request, the
railroads filed an environmental impact statement (EIS) with
sources which would be involved in the proposed action should
it be implemented.
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible Federal official shall
consult with and obtain the comments of any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved. Copies of such statement and the comments and views of the appropriate Federal, State, and local agencies, which are authorized to develop and
enforce environmental standards, shall be available to the President, the Council on Environmental Quality and to the public as provided by section 552 of
Title 5, United States Code, and shall accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review processes ....

(Emphasis added.)

6. 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1971).
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respect to the rate increases and served it on interested parties,
including SCRAP, on January 3, 1972. The ICC served a brief
draft environmental impact statement on all parties to the proceeding on March 6, 1972, and on April 24, 1972, the ICC exercised its power and suspended the effectiveness of the selective
7
rate increases for the maximum allowable seven-month period.
During the period of the suspension of the selective rate increases, but while the surcharge was in effect, a complaint was
filed in the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. SCRAP and other environmental groups alleged that the
decision by the ICC not to suspend the 2.5 percent surcharge
pending its investigation was a violation of NEPA, since this
decision was a major federal action significantly affecting the
environment and an environmental impact statement had not
been prepared nor had environmental issues been considered., It
was argued that the across-the-board surcharge aggravated the
discriminatory preexisting rate structure by inhibiting the use of
recyclable materials and encouraging the use of virgin materials.
Plaintiffs sought to compel the ICC to suspend the 2.5 percent
surcharge and to enjoin the railroads from collecting it. Although
the three-judge court issued a preliminary injunction restraining
the temporary surcharge insofar as it applied to recyclable commodities,8 the Supreme Court reversed, 9 and held that section
15(7) of the Interstate Commerce Act 10 vested exclusive jurisdiction in the ICC to suspend rate increases pending final
determination of their lawfulness."
The investigation by the Commission of the proposed permanent increases culminated in a hearing during which briefs were
submitted and oral arguments were heard. An environmental
impact statement was not prepared for consideration at this hearing, however, nor was one available prior to the issuance of the
Commission's decision which substantially declined to declare
the selective rate increases unlawful and terminated the suspension order previously entered.
The ICC's final report, issued on October 4, 1972, stated that
the "principal issue" in a general revenue proceeding was the
7. Id.
8.SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189 (D.D.C. 1972).
9. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
10. 49 U.S.C. § 15(7) (1971).
11. United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669, 690-98 (1973). The Court rested its decision on the doctrine set forth in Arrow Transp. Co. v. Southern Ry., 372 U.S. 658 (1963).
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need for additional revenue by railroads. Asserting that the railroads had demonstrated such a need and that environmental
factors had been given extensive consideration," the report concluded that the new tariffs would not significantly affect the quality of the human environment and therefore a formal impact
statement was not necessary. 3
The ICC's declaration that an EIS would not be prepared
met with severe criticism and protest from the Council on
Environmental Quality (CEQ) and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA), as well as from the plaintiff. On November 7,
1972, the plaintiff (SCRAP) filed a motion to enjoin the approved
increases. The same day, the ICC suspended until June, 1973,
rate increases on all goods being shipped for purposes of recycling
and reopened Ex parteNo. 281 for "the limited purpose of further
evaluating, in accordance with [NEPA], the environmental effects of increased railroad freight rates and charges on the movements of commodities being transported for the purpose of recycling ... .""'As a result of the ICC's action, SCRAP's request

for a preliminary injunction was denied. 5
The ICC commenced preparation of an EIS on the environmental impact of the rate increases on recyclables. The draft EIS
issued March 5, 1973 and circulated to interested parties for comments, received extensive criticism from EPA, CEQ, the General
Services Administration, the Department of the Interior and the
Department of Commerce. Although acknowledged by the Commission in its final statement, the negative comments did not
cause the ICC to change either its conclusions or its analysis to
any significant degree. Refusing to schedule a new set of hearings
in the reopened proceedings, the ICC issued its final EIS on May
1, 1973.
The impact statement, covering 150 printed pages, expanded
12. [The report noted] two possible adverse effects on the environment
which might flow from failure to declare the increases unlawful. First, the increase in rail rates might divert traffic to trucks, which are allegedly heavier
polluters than trains. Second, the increase in rates for recyclables might discourage their use resulting in increased solid waste-disposal of which creates environmental problems-and an accelerated depleting of the country's natural resources.
United States v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2345-46 (1975). Both dangers were deemed
insubstantial and the claim that the underlying rate structure discriminated against
recyclables was rejected by the report.
13. Ex parte No. 281, Increased Freight Rates and Charges, 341 I.C.C. 290 (1972).
14. SCRAP v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 317, 321 (D.D.C. 1973).
15. SCRAP v. United States, 353 F. Supp. 317 (D.D.C. 1973).
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on the discussion of the underlying rate structure in the October
4, 1972 report and indicated the "marginal impact of the most
recent rate increases""6 on each of the recycling industries.'7 It
was maintained in the statement that a general rate increase
proceeding was not the appropriate vehicle for an examination of
the underlying rate structure.'" The ICC reemphasized that the
analysis in a general revenue proceeding might fall short of the
coverage afforded in other types of proceedings. More specifically,
it suggested that in a proceeding under section 13(1) of the Interstate Commerce Act'9 complaints could be filed asserting that a
particular rate or group of rates is unjust and unreasonable or
otherwise illegal. Attention was also focused on another
Commission case, Ex parteNo. 270, in which a "separate comprehensive investigation into the entire rate structure" was in progress to determine whether the current rate structure interfered
with the government's environmental program."
The statement's conclusion was in accord with the
Commission's original position in the October, 1972 order, i.e.,
that the increases would not have a significant adverse effect on
the environment, and "even if some adverse impact could be
anticipated the rate increases would be justified by the need to
ensure a viable and efficient railroad system."'" The ICC did not
develop a new opinion and merely appended a one-sentence order
to the statement's last page wherein the Commission adopted the
EIS as part of its principal opinion on the rate increases and
discontinued the case.
On May 30, 1973, SCRAP and the Environmental Defense
Fund (EDF) filed a motion for a preliminary injunction restraining the implementation of the freight rate increases with respect
to recyclable commodities. The three-judge court entered an
order temporarily enjoining the railroads from collecting the
rates; however, on motion by the railroads, Chief Justice Burger
stayed the order and on June 25, 1973, the full Court declined to
vacate the stay.22 Subsequently the rate increases on recyclables
were placed into effect. On November 19, 1973, the Supreme
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.

SCRAP v. United States,
United States v. SCRAP,
SCRAP v. United States,
49 U.S.C. § 13(1) (1971).
United States v. SCRAP,
SCRAP v. United States,
United States v. SCRAP,

371 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (D.D.C. 1974).
95 S. Ct. 2336, 2347 (1975).
371 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (D.D.C. 1974).
95 S. Ct. 2336, 2346 (1975).
371 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (D.D.C. 1974).
413 U.S. 917 (1973).
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Court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case
to the district court for reconsideration.?
Ill.
On

remand, 24

SCRAP

V. UNITED STATES

the district court reviewed the ICC's compli-

ance with the requirements imposed by NEPA. In challenging the
ICC order authorizing railroad rate increases on the shipment of
recyclable commodities, the plaintiffs reasserted that increasing
the rates for shipment of recyclable goods discouraged the environmentally sound use of such recyclables by raising costs as well
as aggravating "'the preexisting disparity in shipping costs between these materials and the primary goods with which they
compete.' ",25
Plaintiffs moved for summary judgment and requested: 1) a
declaration that the ICC has failed to comply with NEPA, and
that therefore the orders were void; 2) an order requiring the
Commission to reconsider the general rate increases in accordance with NEPA; and 3) an injunction forbidding the railroads
from collecting the rate increases on recyclables until the Commission complied with NEPA. 5
In responding to the defendants' argument that the court
lacked jurisdiction to review the Commission's compliance with
the commands of NEPA, the district court rejected the applicability of a line of lower court cases 27 holding unreviewable decisions of the ICC not to declare proposed rate increases unlawful
in general revenue proceedings. The question presented in this
case was not the reasonableness of a given rate, but rather the
general issue of whether the environmental costs of the increased
rates were justified by the railroad's revenue requirements. Finding this to be a NEPA case, the court determined that environmental issues were best considered in a single direct review of the
Commission's revenue proceeding rather than by a myriad of
23. United States v. SCRAP, 414 U.S. 1035, 1036 (1973).
24. SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974).
25. Id. at 1293, quoting SCRAP v. United States, 346 F. Supp. 189, 191 (D.D.C.
1972).
26. SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1295 (D.D.C. 1974).
27..Electronic Indus. Ass'n v. United States, 310 F. Supp. 1286 (D.D.C. 1970), af'd
per curiam, 401 U.S. 967 (1971); Alabama Power Co. v. United States, 316 F. Supp. 337
(D.D.C. 1969) and Atlantic City Elec. Co. v. United States, 306 F. Supp. 338 (S.D.N.Y.
1969), both afl'd by equally divided court, 400 U.S. 73 (1970); Koppers Co. v. United
States, 132 F. Supp. 159 (W.D. Pa. 1955); Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v. United States, 11
F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935), cited in SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1296
n.14 (D.D.C. 1974).
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individual proceedings testing the reasonableness of selected
rates. The court noted that delay would be of greater significance
in this case than in previous cases where review of general rate
orders had been refused. Whereas under the Interstate Commerce
Act reparation can always be made to shippers who successfully
challenge particular rates, "the environmental degradation which
continues while challenges to particular rates are being considered may not be reparable at all."28
In examining the question of the ICC's fulfillment of its
NEPA duties, the court emphasized that "the courts have required strict compliance with the procedural commands of
NEPA."29 Finding that the Commission's mode of preparation
and utilization of the EIS violated both the fundamental purpose
and specific command of section 102(2)(C) of NEPA, the court
held that the ICC reached its October 4, 1972 order granting the
general rate increase without benefit of the EIS, and that only
when this order met with an "avalanche of criticism"3 from environmental groups did the Commission decide to reopen the case
to study the environmental effects of the rate increase. Thus, the
court thought that the Commission had 3
already made its decision and all that remained was to determine if the environmental effects of that decision could be justified . . . . Only if the statement is prepared before an agency
decision is made can it serve its purpose of informing the
decision-making process at every stage . ... If the agency fails
to prepare an impact statement before making a decision significantly affecting the environment, it must start its procedures
over again, including the procedure required by Section 102 of
NEPA, so that the decision-making process can be fully
informed throughout.
A vital step in the decisionmaking process for rate increases
is the hearing process. The SCRAP court determined such hearings to be "key aspects of agency review processes during which
environmental impact statements must be considered." 32 After
28. 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1298 (D.D.C. 1974).
29. Id.

30. Id. at 1299.
31. Id. at 1299-1300 (emphasis added).
32. Id. at 1300. The court's recognition of the crucial role played by the hearing
process is not unique. The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit in Greene County
Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir. 1972) stated:
[W]e conclude that the Commission was in violation of NEPA by conducting
hearings prior to the preparation by its staff of its own impact statement. . ..
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reviewing the case law interpreting the hearing requirement in
the Interstate Commerce Act and those sections of the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act 34 dealing with rulemaking proceedings such
as the instant ratemaking proceeding, the district court deter-

mined that nothing required the Commission to conduct a full
adjudicatory hearing. The court concurred with previous decisions by refraining to hold that NEPA always requires an adjudicatory hearing where agency procedures do not provide for one.,
. . [The statement may well go to waste unless it is subject to the full
scrutiny of the hearing process (emphasis in original and footnote omitted).
33. See, e.g., United States v. Allegheny-Ludlum Steel Corp., 406 U.S. 742 (1972).
34. 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. II, 1973); id. §§ 556-57 (1971).
35. However, the court stated that a "strong argument could be made that oral public
hearings should be held based on the CEQ advisory guidelines." 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1307
n.49 (D.D.C. 1974). Those guidelines state:
(e) Agency procedures developed pursuant to section 3(a) of these guidelines shall include provision for public hearings on actions with environmental
impact whenever appropriate, and for providing the public with relevant information, including information on alternative courses of action. In deciding
whether a public hearing is appropriate, an agency should consider: (i) The
magnitude of the proposal in terms of economic costs, the geographic area involved, and the uniqueness or size of commitment of the resources involved; (ii)
the degree of interest in the proposal, as evidenced by requests from the public
and from Federal, State and local authorities that a hearing be held; (iii) the
complexity of the issue and the likelihood that information will be presented at
the hearing which will be of assistance to the agency in fulfilling its responsibilities under the Act; (iv) the extent to which public involvement already has been
achieved through other means, such as earlier public hearings, meetings with
citizen representatives, and/or written comments on the proposed action.
38 Fed. Reg. 10858 (1973).
The topic of public hearings under NEPA is discussed in Guideline 10(e) of the CEQ
guidelines, which provides that:
In accordance with the policy of the National Environmental Policy Act and
Executive Order 11514, agencies have a responsibility to develop procedures to
insure the fullest practicable provision of timely public information and understanding of Federal plans and programs with environmental impact in order to
obtain the views of interested parties. These procedures shall include, whenever
appropriate, provision for public hearings, and shall provide the public with
relevant information, including information on alternative courses of action.
Agencies which hold hearings on proposed administrative actions or legislation
should make the draft environmental statement available to the public at least
fifteen (15) days prior to the time of the relevant hearings except where the
agency prepares the draft statement on the basis of a hearing subject to the
Administrative Procedure Act and preceded by adequate public notice and
information to identify the issues and obtain the comments provided for in
sections 6-9 of these guidelines.
36 Fed. Reg. 7726 (1971).
In addition, the legislative history of NEPA indicates a desire by Congress to make
administrative decisionmakers responsive to public input. See S. REP. No. 296, 91st Cong.,
1st Sess. 5 (1969) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.].
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The court determined, however, that the words "existing agency
review processes" in NEPA should be interpreted as encompassWhereas Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 422 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972), and SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1300 (D.D.C.
1974) may be cited as standing for the proposition that public hearings are "key aspects
of agency review processes during which environmental impact statements must be
considered," id.; Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1285 (9th
Cir. 1973) may be seen as holding that absent specific provisions requiring administrative
hearings, the decision of whether to hold such hearings is a matter within the realm of
agency discretion.
In Jicarillathe court looked at "whether in consideration of the projects involved in
this appeal, hearings were so 'appropriate' that the failure of the Secretary to hold them
constituted a failure to comply with the requirements of NEPA." Id. It was argued by
plaintiffs that such hearings were appropriate for two reasons: the need for a sufficient
record for a court to effectively exercise its limited review of the administrative actions in
question; and secondly, the public would be denied its right to meaningful participation
in the administrative decisionmaking process absent such hearings. Id. The court found
the same infirmity in both arguments: "failure to establish that hearings were so 'appropriate' in relation to each of these projects that failure to hold them constituted a failure
to comply with the requirements of NEPA." Id.
The court distinguished Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.
1972) on the ground that the FPC was required to hold hearings on the application in
question, pursuant to the existing agency review process mandated by the Federal Power
Act § 308, 16 U.S.C. § 825(g) (1971), and that "the question before the court was not
whether or not to hold [public] hearings, but rather at which point in the process such
hearings must be held." Jicarilla Apache Tribe of Indians v. Morton, 471 F.2d 1275, 1286
(9th Cir. 1973). The court refused to hold that unless public hearings were held subsequent
to the issuance of a draft environmental impact statement and prior to the preparation
of the final document, meaningful public participation in the NEPA process cannot exist.
Id. In accord with the Ninth Circuit's holding in Jicarillais National Helium Corp. v.
Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971).
The timing question has also been considered recently by the United States District
Court for the Southern District of New York. In Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of
Eng'rs, 356 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), plaintiffs argued that the refusal of the Army
Corps to hold a public hearing "prior to the issuance of its impact statement" was a
violation of due process since "the public must be heard [and] the public view is meaningful only if it is made known before the final environmental impact statement is drawn."
Id. at 20. In holding that there is neither a statutory nor a due process reason for holding
the public hearing before the impact statement is drafted, the court was in accord with
the reasoning expressed by the Ninth Circuit in Jicarilla:
To hold in the abstract that meaningful public participation in the NEPA
process cannot exist unless public hearings are held subsequent to the issuance
of a draft Environmental Impact Statement and prior to the preparation of the
final document would be to substitute our judgment for that of Congress.
Id.
It is clear that if the agency has its own requirements for public hearings, these
requirements must be followed. Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412 (2d
Cir. 1972); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 356 F. Supp. 14 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
Unless it can be argued, however, that in consideration of the projects involved, hearings
are so appropriate that a failure to hold them constitutes a failure to comply with the
requirements of NEPA, the weight of authority holds that a failure to provide for a public
hearing is not a violation of NEPA.
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ing those procedures which an agency customarily employs in
consideration of the environmental impact of a proposal, as well
as procedures explicitly required by agency regulation. 6 Since an
oral hearing was held when the general rate increase was first
being considered, the court determined that this action established a "strong presumption" that the "existing agency review
processes" included public hearings before the Commission.37 The
court then concluded that the ICC must start its procedures over
again and was required under NEPA to consider its impact statement at an oral hearing prior to issuance of a revised order.3

The court further determined that not only was the Commission derelict in following the decisionmaking process required by
NEPA, but the statement itself was deficient and required repre-

paration. The court noted that although the statement seemed to
meet the prescriptions of NEPA as to form, the responsibility of

the reviewing court extends to more than demanding mere "pro
forma" compliance with section 102(2)(C). Citing Calvert Cliffs'
CoordinatingCommittee v. AEC,3 the court emphasized that to
meet its responsibility a reviewing court "must be assured that
the agency engaged in a full and good faith individualized consid-

eration and balancing of environmental factors."40 The court concluded that the statement did not present such a full and good

faith consideration and balancing.
36. 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1307 (D.D.C. 1974).
37. Id.
38. Id. In an attempt to distinguish Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109, 1117 (D.C. Cir. 1971) and Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412,
422 (2d Cir. 1972), the defendants noted that in these cases the agency hearings resulted
in a report either from the examiner or hearing board and as such constituted an initial
stage in the decisionmaking process, whereas in the general revenue proceeding before the
Commission no intermediate opinion is rendered after the hearing and the only decision
reached is the final Commission order.
The court rejected this argument by stating that nothing in either of the cases or
NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1971) indicated that unless a stage in the
review process culminates in an intermediate agency opinion, that stage may be circumvented for purposes of NEPA. "Indeed where, as here, the hearing is before the Commission itself, and is the only one provided, it may well be the most important stage in the
decision-making process." 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1301 (D.D.C. 1974).
Defendants supported their decision not to hold hearings during which the impact
statement could have been considered, arguing that concerned persons had adequate
opportunity to comment on the approval of the rate increase. The court rejected this
argument and held that neither the rate hearing held prior to the October order nor the
Commission's circulation of comments in the draft EIS can "substitute for strict compliance with the commands of Section 102(2)(C)." Id.
39. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
40. 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1301 (D.D.C. 1974), citing Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm.
v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
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While characterizing the language and style used in the
statement as "combative, defensive and advocatory,"4 1 the court
indicated that a more important matter influencing its judgment
of the adequacy of the impact statement was the manner in which
comments made on the draft statement were handled. With regard to the comment procedure section 102(2)(C) of NEPA
states:"
Prior to making any detailed statement, the responsible
Federal official shall consult with and obtain the comments of
any Federal agency which has jurisdiction by law or special
expertise with respect to any environmental impact involved.
The Commission had circulated a draft statement to most of
the parties in the action, but the extensive critical comments
received were merely attached to the back of its final statement.
Some arguments were made against the criticisms in the body of
the final statement, however, none of the comments resulted in
even a partial alteration by the Commission of its analysis or
conclusions. 3
The court found as the final statement's most fundamental
and significant deficiency, "the limitation of its analysis to the
marginal impact of the most recent rate increase with no discussion of whether the underlying rate structure itself significantly
affects the environment."" The court deemed analysis of the environmental effects of the underlying rate structure to be indispensable to an understanding of the impact of approving the
recyclable rate increases. It noted that failing to hold down the
rate increases on recyclables could have a cumulative effect on
the environment, since the impact on the underlying rate struc41. 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1302 (D.D.C. 1974).
42, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1971).
43. The court found the Commission's unresponsiveness to three of the critical comments of other federal agencies "particularly troublesome." 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1302
(D.D.C. 1974). First, the Department of Commerce and EPA suggested that a quantitative
and thorough economic study be conducted to determine the elasticity of demand for
secondary materials with regard to changes in transportation costs.
Second, although EPA suggested a Department of Transportation Burden Study
which they felt might establish that at least some secondary materials contribute more
revenue over costs than do the virgin materials with which they compete, the statement
failed to provide any comprehensive alternative analysis of the relative cost contribution
of secondary and primary materials.
Third, the draft statement was criticized by both EPA and CEQ for its failure to
consider the impact of the rate increase on long-term investment in facilities which can
make fuller productive use of recyclables. 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1302-03 (D.D.C. 1974).
44. Id. at 1304.
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ture could be eliminated by declining to approve rate increases
on recyclables when the railroads request a general rate increase.45
That such cumulative impact must be considered in NEPA statements is supported by the legislative history 6 of the Act as well
as by CEQ guidelines.47
The court rejected the Commission's argument that its
ongoing, comprehensive investigation into the railroad's freight
rate structure, Ex parte No. 270, justified its failure to consider
the environmental impact of the underlying rate structure in the
instant case. Regardless of the comprehensiveness of this study
and its nearness to completion, the detailed impact statement
required by NEPA mandates that these considerations be taken
into account "before federal action significantly affecting the environment is taken . . .,.
Concluding that the Commission's preparation and utilization of the impact statement as well as its contents failed to
comport with the requirements of section 102(2)(C), the court
vacated the orders of the ICC which had terminated Ex parteNo.
281 without declaring the rate increases unlawful. The court ordered the Commission to prepare another environmental impact
statement analyzing the underlying rate structure, the elasticity
of demand for recyclables, and the effects of the rate structure on
investment in manufacturing facilities which can make intensive
use of scrap. The court further ordered that after comments were
45. Id. The EPA criticized the final impact statement in this regard:
"There is evidence that the current rate structure is inequitable in its treatment
of some secondary materials and general rate increases tend to perpetuate these
inequities." Letter from Acting Deputy EPA Administrator John Quares to
I.C.C. Secretary Robert L. Oswald, dated June 6, 1973.
SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1304 n.39 (D.D.C. 1974).
46. Environmental problems are only dealt with when they reach crisis
proportions. Public desires and aspirations are seldom consulted. Important
decisions concerning the use and the shape of man's future environment continue to be made in small but steady increments which perpetuate rather than
avoid the recognized mistakes of previous decades.
S. REP., supra note 35, at 5.
47. The statutory clause "major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment" is to be construed by agencies with a view
to the overall, cumulative impact of the action proposed (and of further actions
contemplated) . . . In considering what constitutes major action significantly
affecting the environment, agencies should bear in mind that the effect of many
Federal decisions about a project or complex of projects can be individually
limited but cumulatively considerable.
38 Fed. Reg. 10857 (1973).
48. SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1305 (D.D.C. 1974).
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received a final statement be prepared to "'accompany the
[consideration of the proposed rate increase] through the existing agency review processes.' . . . [such] review process [to]
include a hearing before the Commission."49 The court declined
to enjoin the collection of the rates pending Commission reconsideration of the case.
SCRAP v. United States may be regarded as supporting the
proposition that the decisionmaking process mandated by NEPA
is not highly flexible but rather establishes strict standards for
compliance. In support of this view the court quoted from Calvert
Cliffs' where the mandate to federal agencies to identify, develop,
and consider environmental factors during the decisionmaking
process "to the fullest extent possible" was considered:"
We must stress as forcefully as possible that this language does
not provide an escape hatch for footdragging agencies; it does
not make NEPA's procedural requirements somehow "discretionary." Congress did not intend the Act to be such a paper
tiger. Indeed, the requirement of environmental consideration
"to the fullest extent possible" sets a high standard for agencies,
a standard which must be rigorously enforced by the reviewing
courts.
The Calvert Cliffs' court went a step further in stating the
role of the courts when reviewing agency compliance with the
mandates of NEPA: 5'
[I]f the decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factorsconducted fully and in good faith-it is the responsibility of the
courts to reverse.
With respect to the type of balancing analysis mandated by
NEPA, the court in Calvert Cliffs' described it as "rather finely
tuned and systematic":"
NEPA mandates a case-by-case balancing judgment on the part
of federal agencies. In each individual case, the particular economic and technical benefits of planned action must be assessed
and then weighed against environmental costs; alternatives
must be considered which would affect the balance of values
49. Id. at 1306.
50. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1114 (D.C. Cir. 1971)
(Wright, J.).
51. Id. at 1115.
52. Id. at 1113.
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. . . .In some cases, the benefits will be great enough to justify
a certain quantum of environmental costs; in other cases, they
will not be so great and the proposed action may have to be
abandoned or significantly altered . . . .The point of the individualized balancing analysis is to ensure that . . . the optimally beneficial action is finally taken. 3

That the court in SCRAP v. United States had considerable

authority 4 for requiring strict compliance with the procedural
commands of NEPA is evident. Furthermore, in most cases the
courts have closely scrutinized the manner in which the agency

conducted its final decisionmaking, finding it reasonable and in
the public interest to insist on strict compliance with NEPA and

enjoining actions until such compliance is forthcoming. 5 The
courts have thus made clear that NEPA is not to be regarded as

another procedural nuisance by the agencies, but rather as a
strong dictate that environmental costs must be thoroughly as-

sessed, balanced against other project benefits and costs, and
integrated into every important stage in the decisionmaking process.
The question of when in the decisionmaking process NEPA
obligations arise was also reviewed by the district court in
SCRAP. The court noted that section 102(2)(C) specifically commands that the EIS and comments of concerned agencies regarding the statement "shall accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review processes."5 6 It was determined that the
purpose of this command is: 7
53. Id. at 1123; see, e.g., Ely v. Velde, 451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
54. See, e.g., Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency, 499 F.2d

502, 513 (D.C. Cir. 1974); F. ANDERSON, NEPA IN THE COURTS 49-55 (1973); ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW INSTITUTE, FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 301 (E.Dolgin & T. Guilbert eds. 1974).
In response to the argument that an injunction pending strict compliance with the
provisions of NEPA would cause undue delay and enormous additional public expense,
the court in Calvert Cliffs' answered:
[Slome delay is inherent whenever the NEPA consideration is conducted
.... It is far more consistent with the purposes of the Act to delay operation
at a stage where real environmental protection may come about than at a stage
where corrective action may be so costly as to be impossible.
449 F.2d 1109, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
See also Daly v. Volpe, 350 F. Supp. 252, 257-58 (W.D. Wash. 1972).
55. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
The Second Circuit has accorded explicit approval to Calvert Cliffs' application of NEPA.
Greene County Planning Bd. v. FPC, 455 F.2d 412, 420 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
849 (1972).
56. 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1299 (D.D.C. 1974), quoting NEPA § 102(2)(C), 49 U.S.C.
4332(2)(C) (1971).
57. SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1299 (D.D.C. 1974).
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[T]o ensure that federal agencies integrate considerations of
the potential environmental impacts of their contemplated actions with the policy considerations traditionally attending such
actions.

In assessing the Commission's compliance with the decisionmaking process required by NEPA, the court determined the ICC's
proposal to be "consideration of the proposed rate increase."5 8
The court noted that "[o]nly if the statement is prepared before
an agency decision is made can it serve its purpose of informing
the decision-making at every stage." 9 Since the court found that
the Commission had already reached its decision to approve the
general rate increase, and "all that remained was to determine if
the environmental effects of that decision could be justified,"6
the decisionmaking process required by NEPA had been violated.
The court relied on the language of Calvert Cliffs':'
58. Id. at 1306. The district court's interpretation of the statutory language "proposal" is of particular import when contrasted with the Supreme Court's interpretation
of that term in United States v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2355-56 (1975). For a discussion
of this issue, see text accompanying notes 79-86 infra.
59. 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1299-1300 (D.D.C. 1974).
60. Id, at 1299.
61. Id. at 1300, quoting Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109,
1118 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (emphasis in original). A recent decision involving the "difficult
question of the proper balance between an agency's discretion in deciding whether, and
when, to issue an environmental impact statement, and the judiciary's role in overseeing
exercise of that discretion," is Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856 (D.C. Cir. 1975),
decided only one week before the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. SCRAP.
The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia reviewed the issue of the proper timing
of impact statement preparation, reaffirming its decision in Calvert Cliffs':
We think it patent that the term "proposals" does not encompass every suggestion, however unlikely to reach fruition, made by a federal officer. Certainly
federal officers are entitled to dream out loud without filing an impact statement. Thus we think it proper to inquire, before an EIS is required, whether the
proposal for action has progressed beyond the "dream" stage into some tangible
form so that the time for an impact statement is ripe ....

[T]he "ripeness" necessary before a statement is required is slight. Preparation of a statement must precede, or at least accompany, preparation of the
recommendation or report on the proposal, so that the agency may have the
opportunity to assess the environmental impact of its plans before committing
itself, even tentatively, to action. An impact statement is designed to aid agency
decision-making, not provide an ex post facto justification for it.
Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 879 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
See also Scientists' Institute for Pub. Information, Inc. v. AEC, 481 F.2d 1079, 1094 (D.C.
Cir. 1973) ("[sjtatements must be written late enough in the development process to
contain meaningful information, but they must be written early enough so that whatever
information is contained can practically serve as input into the decisionmaking process");
Lathan v. Volpe, 455 F.2d 1111, 1121 (9th Cir. 1971); Citizens for Clean Air, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 349 F. Supp. 696, 708 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) ("Once a project has reached a coherent
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Compliance to the "fullest" possible extent would seem to demand that environmental issues be considered at every important stage in the decisionmaking process concerning a particular
action-at every stage where an overall balancing of environmental and nonenvironmental factors is appropriate and where
alterations might be made in the proposed action to minimize
environmental costs.
In viewing the ICC's proposal as a "consideration of the proposed rate increase"" and determining that the decision to grant
the general rate increase had been reached prior to consideration
of environmental factors associated with the proposal through the
preparation of an environmental impact statement, the district
court in SCRAP v. United States was in accord with the weight
of authority requiring preparation of an impact statement early
enough to "accompany the proposal through the existing agency
review processes.""
It is important to note that the court found that the ICC
totally failed to reconsider the question of the recyclable rate
increase. No attempt was made to integrate the considerations of
national transportation policy, justifying the rate increase in light
of the environmental considerations analyzed in the impact statement, nor were critical comments of concerned agencies and environmental groups confronted or even acknowledged.64
Because the ICC failed to take these matters into account,
the court found that the ICC must start its procedures over
again.6 5 Specifically, the court ordered that another hearing be
held before the Commission. The court reasoned that absent
other violations of NEPA,16
it might be sufficient for the Commission to hold another hearing in which all parties could participate fully in canvassing the
NEPA and national transportation policy considerations concerned with rate increases. The Commission could then make a
thorough reconsideration of the proposed recyclable rate increase in light of that hearing and the impact statement which
it has already prepared.
stage of development it requires an environmental impact study. The comprehensive
review contemplated by the Act can only be efficacious if undertaken as early as possible."); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731, 735-36 (D. Conn. 1972).
62. 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1306 (D.D.C. 1974).
63. Id. at 1299.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 1300, 1306.
66. Id. at 1301.
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Given the importance of the public hearing" as an instrument for
infusing input to effectuate the balancing process required by
NEPA, and the court's interpretation of the statutory language
"existing agency review processes" as encompassing those procedures which an agency customarily employs in consideration of a
proposal as well as those procedures required by agency regulations, it is not surprising that the court viewed the holding of
another hearing to be necessary for a thorough reconsideration of
the proposed recyclable rate increase.
Case law supports the proposition that an agency found to
be in violation of NEPA because the EIS is filed too late in the
decisionmaking process, must objectively reconsider the project
in light of the environmental factors disclosed. The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reviewed the timing question in Upper
Pecos Association v. Stans" (Pecos#1). Pecos #1 involved a grant
of funds made by the Economic Development Administration
(EDA) for a road project. Appellant Upper Pecos Association
argued that the preparation of the environmental impact statement after the offer of the grant was "a meaningless gesture." 9
Finding that several steps in the review process had to be accomplished prior to the approval of a necessary right-of-way, and that
the EIS would provide the basis upon which the Forest Service
would decide on the issuance of this easement, the court upheld
the decision of the trial court that the requirements of NEPA had
been satisfied."°
In Upper Pecos Association v. Stans" (Pecos #2), the Tenth
Circuit again reviewed the issue of the proper timing of NEPA
review, holding that "unquestionably appellees should have
drafted their environmental impact statement prior to making

the grant offer" :72
67. See notes 32-38 supra and accompanying text.
68. 452 F.2d 1233 (10th Cir. 1971), vacated and remanded to determine mootness, 409
U.S. 1021 (1972).
69. Id. at 1236.
70. Id. at 1237.
71. 500 F.2d 17 (10th Cir. 1974).

72. Id. at 19, citing 1972 CEQ

THIRD ANNUAL REPORT

246.

Despite the requirement of early preparation of an EIS, several courts have found that
when the deficiency concerns matters of timing, if there is no prejudicial failure to comply
with NEPA, courts need not require strict compliance and adjustments may be made in
light of the public interest.
In National Forest Preservation Group v. Butz, 485 F.2d 408 (9th Cir. 1973), the Court.
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed a decision of the Forest Service to exchange
certain government land for lands of Burlington Northern Railroad. A NEPA statement
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Consideration of environmental factors should come in the
early stages of program and project formulation. If the decision
is delayed until the latter stages it "tends to serve as a post facto
justification of decisions based on traditional and narrow
grounds." [Citation omitted.]
The court found that the EDA was not precluded from reconsidering the project, and that therefore the EDA had complied with
the mandates of NEPA.
In a case where the agency has failed to comply with the
timing requirement of NEPA, if environmental impacts are to be
factored into the agency's ultimate decision, it appears that a
reconsideration of environmental factors deemed necessary by
the court in SCRAP v. United States is imperative.
on the exchanges was not prepared until after the decision of the Regional Forester approving the exchanges. Stating that normally an impact statement must be prepared prior to
the initial decision to commit resources, and noting that the "proper timing was not
followed in this case," the court declined to remand on this ground and concluded that
there had been no prejudicial failure to comply with NEPA. "[Tihe sterile exercise of
having the Regional Forester consider the impact statement on an exchange which had
already been approved by all levels of the administrative hierarchy would serve no useful
purpose." Id. at 412.
Another recent case dealing with the proper timing of NEPA review via the preparation of an impact statement is Jones v. District of Columbia Redevelopment Land Agency,
499 F.2d 502 (D.C. Cir. 1974). In Jones, the D.C. Circuit held that a lower court had not
abused its discretion in deciding that something less than strict compliance with NEPA
was sufficient to avoid a preliminary injunction. In reaching this decision the court was
impressed with the value of the urban renewal projects involved and the fact that delay
might prove "fatal." Furthermore, the court was aware that the defendant had taken
remedial action which "achieved the substance of NEPA's requirements and purposes."
Id. at 514.
The propriety of an agency taking action prior to the drafting of an environmental
impact statement was considered in City of N. Miami v. Train, 377 F. Supp. 1264 (S.D.
Fla. 1974) and in Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In City of N. Miami, the
plaintiffs argued that the acquisition of a site for a secondary sewage treatment facility
prior to the preparation of an environmental impact statement was evidence that the
federal agency was predisposed against land application and in favor of ocean disposal.
The District Court for the Southern District of Florida determined that "[tihe site
acquisition [did] not constitute a significant federal action before which" a § 102 NEPA
statement had to be prepared. Id. at 1273. Stating that the site was "subject to adaptation
to either advanced waste treatment or land application," the court concluded that certain
actions may be taken prior to drafting an EIS without proving to be a fatal error. Id.
In Gage the court considered the argument that site acquisition prior to the issuance
of a permit for a nuclear power plant would affect the final cost-benefit balancing process
when alternatives are considered. The court rejected this argument and stated that "if
every decision which altered the 'cost of change' had to await an impact statement, we
would soon be reduced to government by impasse." Gage v. AEC, 479 F.2d 1214,1219 n.17
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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In its analysis of the questions presented in the appeal from
the three-judge court decision in SCRAP v. United States, the
Supreme Court focused on whether the ICC had complied with
the mandates of NEPA which related to impact-statement preparation and adequacy. Finding that the ICC complied fully with
NEPA in its consideration of proposed rate increases, the Supreme Court, in a seven to one decision, reversed the three-judge
court.73
In an opinion by Justice White, the Court rejected arguments
by the railroads that the lower court lacked jurisdiction to review
the decision of the ICC made in a general revenue proceeding.
The railroads argued that the three-judge court reviewed an issue
not yet finally decided by the ICC in violation of settled principles of finality of administrative remedies.74 The Court noted that
the rule that decisions by the ICC in general revenue proceedings
are unreviewable is supported by a long line of district court
decisions. 5 The Court, however, made a distinction between the
interim nature of the general revenue proceedings for purposes of
ratemaking as contrasted with the review of environmental considerations:76
Unlike the issue of the reasonableness of a particular rate.
the issue addressed by the court below had already been finally
decided by the Commission and the relief sought from and
granted by the court below could not have been obtained from
the ICC in a subsequent § 13 proceeding. The issue decided by
the District Court was whether under NEPA the ICC had given
adequate consideration to environmental factors in the general
revenue proceeding. When the ICC terminated the general revenue proceeding, the one thing which it must certainly have finally decided was that it need give no further considerationto
environmental factors in that proceeding .

. .

. [Footnote

omitted.]
73. United States v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct. 2336 (1975), rev'g SCRAP v. United States,
371 F. Supp. 1291 (D.D.C. 1974).
74. The railroads maintained that environmental groups could file complaints under
Interstate Commerce Act § 13, 49 U.S.C. § 13 (1971), and challenge the justness and
reasonableness of rates or groups of rates. Noting that the lower court had tentatively
ruled otherwise, the Court decided not to rule on the issue. United States v. SCRAP, 95
S. Ct. 2336, 2354 (1975).
75. See cases cited in United States v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2351 (1975).
76. Id. at 2354-55 (emphasis in original).
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The Court thus laid to rest the arguments of finality and
exhaustion in general revenue proceedings "[w]hen agency or
departmental consideration of environmental factors in connection with that federal action is complete ....
The Court then considered the ICC's compliance with the
decisionmaking process mandated by NEPA. It focused upon the
district court's holding that the oral hearing which the ICC chose
to convene prior to its October 4, 1972 order was an "existing
agency review process" during which a final draft environmental
impact statement should have been available, and that the ICC
should have "started over again" after it decided to prepare a
final impact statement. 7 In holding that the district court erred
in these determinations, the Supreme Court interpreted the language in NEPA which states that "such statement . . . shall
accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes."
This sentence does not, contrary to the District Court opinion,
affect the time when the "statement" must be prepared. It simply says what must be done with the "statement" once prepared-it must accompany the "proposal." 9
To determine when a final statement must be prepared, the
Court looked to the language in NEPA requiring all federal agencies to include a detailed statement "in every recommendation or
report on proposals for . . . major Federal actions, significantly
affecting the quality of the human environment."
Under this sentence of the statute, the time at which the agency
must prepare the final "statement" is the time at which it
makes a recommendation or report on a proposal for federal
action. Where an agency initiates federal actions by publishing
a proposal and then holding hearings on the proposal, the statute would appear to require an impact statement to be included
in the proposal and to be considered at the hearing. Here, however, until the October 4, 1972 report, the ICC had made no
proposal, recommendation or report. The only proposal was the
proposed new rates filed by the railroads. Thus, the earliest time
at which the statute required a statement was the time of the
ICC's report of October 4, 1972-sometime after the oral
hearing. [Footnotes omitted.]80
77. Id. at 2355.
78. Id. at 2355-56.

79. Id. at 2356.
80. Id. (emphasis in original).
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The Court thus determined that there was no ICC "proposal" for which an impact statement should have been prepared
until issuance of the October 4, 1972 report and therefore the
earliest time at which NEPA required an impact statement was
at the time of the October report-after the hearing. At this
point, the Court reasoned, it was necessary for an EIS to accompany the proposal through the "existing agency review processes." Any existing agency review process, however, wherein
environmental factors disclosed by the EIS could be considered,
ended when the general revenue proceeding terminated on October 4th. The Court, in considering the jurisdictional issues, had
clearly indicated that the general revenue proceeding was the
proper forum for the consideration of environmental factors:"'
All parties now agree that a general revenue proceeding is itself
a "major federal action," independent from any later adjudication of the reasonableness of particular rates, requiring its own
final environmental impact statement. .

.

.This conclusion is

clearly correct. Thus whatever consideration of environmental
matters is necessary or proper at the general revenue proceeding
is over and done with when that proceeding terminates.
How the Court decided that environmental factors could be
integrated into the decisionmaking process at a point when the
ICC renders a final decision terminating the general revenue proceeding, is unclear. It appears that the Supreme Court has determined that in order to comply with NEPA, the ICC need not
prepare an impact statement until the date of their final decision
on the proposed rate increase.
This interpretation of what constitutes a "proposal" differs
entirely from the view expressed by the district court. The district
court viewed the ICC proposal as a "considerationof the proposed
rate increase.""2 The ICC's consideration of the proposed rate
increase commenced after the railroads proposed to file tariffs
increasing rates. At the point when the ICC commenced consideration of the proposed rate increase, presumably prior to its rendering a final decision in the matter, the requirement of the preparation of an environmental impact statement matured. Because
one of the steps in the existing agency review process is the public
hearing, the district court reasoned that the environmental im81. Id. at 2355,
82. SCRAP v. United States, 371 F. Supp. 1291, 1306 (D.D.C. 1974) (emphasis
added).
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pact statement must be prepared for inclusion at those hearings.
By requiring that in considering the proposed rate increase,
the ICC balance environment costs against the revenue needs of
the railroads prior to reaching its final decision in the general
revenue proceeding, the district court provided for the integration
of environmental factors into the decisionmaking process. The
reasoning of the district court appears to be in accord with the
decisions rendered in such notable cases as Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Committee v. AEC,"3 Greene County Planning
Board v. FPC4 and Harlem Valley TransportationAssociation v.
Stafford.85 The Supreme Court has cast the strength of these
cases as precedent supporting this view into doubt by stating:8 6
To the extent to which [the cases cited above] read the requirement that the statement accompany the proposal through the
existing agency review process differently they would appear to
conflict with the statute.
The Court next focused on the requirement in NEPA that
agencies consult with other environmentally expert agencies
"prior to making any detailed statement" and the CEQ guidelines which provide: 7
To the fullest extent possible, all . . . hearings [on proposed
agency action] shall include consideration of the environmental
aspects of the proposed action. . . . Agencies should make any
draft environmental [impact] statements to be issued available to the public at least fifteen (15) days prior to the time of
such hearings.
Finding that all draft impact statements in existence were
circulated before the hearings and that environmental issues
pervaded the hearings when they were held, the Court reasoned
that the consultation required under the Act and CEQ guidelines
occurred from the outset. The Court concluded "[p]rocedurally,
NEPA was thus thoroughly complied with through October 4,
1972."s8
In assessing what the ICC should have done, assuming that
83.
84.
85.
86.

449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
455 F.2d 412 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 849 (1972).
500 F.2d 328 (2d Cir. 1974).
95 S. Ct. 2336, 2356 n.20 (1975).

87. 40 C.F.R. § 1500.7(d) (1974), as quoted in United States v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct.
2336, 2356 (1975).
88. 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2356 (1975) (emphasis in original).

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

23

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 2

236

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 4, 1976]

a separate EIS should have been prepared to accompany its
October 4 report, or assuming its consideration of environmental
factors in the report was inadequate, the Court disagreed with the
district court's holding that the ICC should have "started over
again." 9 The Court stated: 0
To the extent that the District Court's conclusion to the contrary is based on its belief that the draft statement of March
1972, had to be considered at a hearing, it is incorrect for the
reasons stated above [i.e., definition of the "proposal"]. To
the extent that it is based on the District Court's belief that the
ICC did not in good faith reconsider its October 4, 1972, order
in light of the impact statement, the District Court's decision
is without support in the record.
In its rejection of the first rationale that could be advanced
to support the district court's determination that the ICC should
have "started over again," the Court presumably means that
given its interpretation of the term "proposal," no ICC proposal
was in existence prior to the October 4, 1972 report, and therefore,
any environmental impact statement which had been prepared
need not receive consideration at the hearing stage of the ICC
review process."
92
In rejecting the second rationale the Court reasoned:
The ICC was in as good a position to correct a statutory error
by integrating environmental factors into its reopened Ex parte
281 and into its decision in May 1973, as it would have been if
the October 4, 1972, report had never been written; this it proceeded to do and we perceive no basis for affirming the District
Court's decision in this respect.
The Court thus focused on the irrelevance of the October 4,
1972 report for purposes of determining whether the ICC had
properly reconsidered its October 4, 1972 order in light of the
impact statement. Finding "no basis" to decide otherwise, the
Court concluded that the ICC had properly integrated environ3
mental factors into its reopened Ex parte No. 281.1
The Supreme Court's failure to find any basis in the record
indicating a failure by the ICC to reconsider its October 4, 1972
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id. at 2356-57.
See text accompanying notes 79-81 supra.
95 S. Ct. 2336, 2357 (1975).
Id.
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order in light of the environmental factors exposed in the EIS is
clearly in conflict with the district court's determination on that
issue. The district court found that the ICC had already made its
decision regarding the rate increases and all that remained was
to determine if the environmental effects of that decision could
be "justified." Furthermore, the lower court found evidence supporting the conclusion that the ICC "neither intended to give nor
actually gave full reconsideration to the question of the recyclable
rate increase"94 by looking to the Commission's May 2, 1973 order
discontinuing Ex parte No. 281. The one-sentence order merely
adopted the entire staff-prepared impact statement and made no
attempt to integrate considerations of national transportation
policy justifying the rate increase in light of the environmental
impacts disclosed in the impact statement. "Nor does it confront
or even acknowledge the critical comments of other concerned
agencies and environmental groups appended to the statement."95
Such a failure to integrate environmental considerations into
considerations of national transportation policy is clearly contrary to the balancing analysis mandated by NEPA. In Calvert
Cliffs' CoordinatingCommittee v. AEC " the court reasoned that
in order to properly consider environmental factors a balancing
process must be conducted wherein environmental costs of a project are compared to its economic and technical benefits. 7 If a
court determined that an agency had not undertaken the balancing process in good faith an agency action could be reversed-since courts may exact strict compliance with NEPA's
procedures. 8
The district court in SCRAP v. United States found an obvious failure by the ICC to reconsider the recyclable rate increases
in light of environmental consequences. This failure was highlighted by a total disregard of adverse comments of other agencies
and environmental groups. The Supreme Court found no basis99
in the record for supporting the district court's decision on this
issue.
One might question how one court's view of the evidence in
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.

371 F. Supp. 1291, 1299 (D.D.C. 1974).
Id.
449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
Id. at 1113.
Id. at 1115.
United States v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2359 (1975).
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the record could vary so drastically with that of another court.
Alternatively, in the absence of such an apparent disparity, one
might question the validity of the precedent requiring a "rather
finely tuned and 'systematic'" balancing process to be engaged
in by the agencies and the finding that courts may exact strict
compliance with NEPA's procedures.' 0
On the face of the decision, the Supreme Court has left intact
the requirement that an agency, failing to timely submit an EIS
to accompany its proposal through the review process, must reconsider its decision in light of the environmental consequences
exposed. The strength and enforceability of that requirement,
however, is questionable when such marginal "integration" as
carried out by the ICC suffices to substantiate the necessary reconsideration.
The Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the district
court that the impact statement was deficient in that it did not
sufficiently analyze the underlying rate structure. SCRAP and
other appellees argued that the underlying rate structure discriminates against recyclables with serious environmental consequences. Given this fact, the environmental consequences flowing
from a facially neutral increase must be explored in an impact
statement and can only be explored by analyzing the underlying
rate structure. For this and other reasons, 0' they argued, the ICC
should not have been permitted to terminate Ex parte No. 281
without having completed this analysis.
In rejecting this argument the Supreme Court cited United
States v. Louisiana,' which gave the ICC wide discretion in deciding which issues to address in a general revenue proceeding
and permitted the ICC to postpone comprehensive consideration
of claims of discrimination. The Court further noted that prior to
the initiation of Ex parte No. 281, the ICC had commenced the
investigation of the underlying rate structure in Ex parteNo. 270
in which specific attention was being focused on environmental
issues. Given the wide discretion of the ICC in determining which
issues to address in general revenue proceedings and the ongoing
100. See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
101. Appellees argued that the ICC was tardy in complying with NEPA, that
the ICC was required to analyze the underlying rate structure only once with a
view toward environmental consequences; that it had plenty of time and cause
to do so before Ex parte 281; and that it should, therefore, not have been
permitted to terminate Ex parte 281 without having done so.
Id. at 2358.

102. 290 U.S. 70 (1933).
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nature of Ex parte No. 270, the Court concluded that even if
NEPA were read to require that an analysis of the underlying rate
structure be done at least once prior to approving a facially neutral general rate increase," 3
no purpose could have been served by ordering it to thoroughly
explore the question in the confined and inappropriate context
of a railroad proposal for a general rate increase when it was
already doing so in a more appropriate proceeding.
The Court further remarked in this regard that:0

4

In order to decide what kind of an environmental impact
statement need be prepared, it is necessary first to describe
accurately the "federal action" being taken. The action taken
here was a decision-entirely nonfinal with respect to particular
rates-not to declare unlawful a percentage increase which on
its face applied equally to virgin and some recyclable materials
and which on its face limited the increase permitted on other
recyclables. [Footnote omitted.]
This being a general revenue proceeding, the action taken was in
response to the claim made by the railroads that they were undergoing a financial crisis. The inquiry made at such a proceeding
is primarily whether such a crisis exists, and leaves to future
proceedings the task of assessing challenges to rates on individual
commodities. "The point is that it is the latter question-usually
involved in a general revenue proceeding only to a limited extent-which may raise the most serious environmental issues."'0 5
The Court determined that the district court finding of an implicit approval of the underlying rate structure in the ICC's decision in Ex parte No. 281 was inaccurate and precipitated an
"unwarranted intrusion into an apparently sensible decision by
the ICC to take much more limited 'action' in that proceeding
and to undertake the larger action in a separateproceeding better
suited to the task." [Footnote omitted.]'
Having defined the scope of the "federal action" taken by the
ICC in the instant proceeding as not implicitly approving the
underlying rate structure, the Court concluded that the impact
statement was adequate. The Court indicated, however, that
103.
104.
105.
106.

95 S. Ct. 2336, 2358 (1975).
Id. at 2357 (emphasis in original).
Id.
Id. at 2359.
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their determination as to adequacy might have been different if
the ICC had been approving the entire rate structure. 07
In his dissent Mr. Justice Douglas highlighted the inadequacies of the environmental impact statement prepared by the ICC,
and characterized the statement as presenting a "melange of statistics" purporting to prove that an increase in the transportation
rates of recyclable materials would not create any adverse impact
on the environment.0 8 Douglas indicated that the ICC's analysis
had been "thoroughly discredited" by the comments of a host of
agencies, including not only such environment-oriented agencies
as the Environmental Protection Agency and the Council on Environmental Quality, but also the Department
of Commerce and
09
the General Services Administration.

In response to appellees' argument that the rate increases for
recyclables exacerbated an existing discrimination against these
materials in the rate structure and that an analysis of the underlying rate structure in the EIS is necessary in order to assess the
environmental consequences flowing from the rate increases, Mr.
Justice Douglas noted the'Court's implicit concession of the
shortcomings in the Commission's analysis. Both the Commission and the Court relied heavily on the prospect that the environmental issues would receive further study in Ex parteNo. 270,
a proceeding designed to investigate the entire freight rate structure."' Rejecting the. validity of such a reliance on the potential
findings of Ex parte No. 270 Justice Douglas stated:'"
But NEPA commands an agency to consider environmental effect before it takes a "major federal action," not to relegate
consideration to further proceedings after action is taken,
particularly where there is no assurance that a prompt conclusion will be forthcoming.
It was pointed out that Ex parteNo. 270 had been in progress
for more than two years when Ex parte No. 281 was terminated
by the Commission. Not only had the scope of the investigation
not been fully defined at that time, but the Commission took no
steps to expedite completion of that part of the investigation
107. "Whatever the result would have been if the ICC had been approving the entire
rate structure in Ex parte 281, [footnote omitted] given the nature of the actions taken
by the ICC, the lower court was plainly incorrect." Id.
108. Id. at 2360.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 2361.
111. Id.
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embracing the environmental issues controverted in Ex parteNo.
281. At the time of the decision by the Supreme Court Mr. Justice
Douglas noted that the Court did not even know if a completion
date was in sight for Ex parte No. 270. "Meanwhile, environmental damage-irreversibledamage . . . may be continuing, with

its magnitude unknown."" 2
Finding that the district court was correct in rejecting the
Commission's representations that a complete treatment of the
environmental issues was beyond its capability and therefore
should not be required, Douglas indicated that one of the purposes of NEPA "was to force agencies to acquire expertise in
environmental matters, even if attention to parochial matters in
the past had not demanded this capability." [Footnote omitted.]" 3
Concluding that the lower court's reasoning followed the
spirit of NEPA by telling the Commission to improve its performance, Mr. Justice Douglas noted:"'
NEPA is more than a technical statute of administrative
procedure. It is a commitment to the preservation of our natural
environment. The statute's language conveys the urgency of
that task.
V.

UNITED STATES V.

SCRAP:

IMPLICATIONS

One might question what effect the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. SCRAP will have on future cases. Can it
be limited to the unique factual situation presented to the Court
in this challenge to the ICC's compliance with NEPA, or have the
oft-quoted phrases of Calvert Cliffs' and Greene County interpreting the language of NEPA met an alien successor?
United States v. SCRAP can be viewed as interpreting the
mandate of NEPA to require the preparation of an EIS to "accompany the proposal through the existing agency review processes"" 5 only when an agency proceeding has reached the stage
112. Id. (emphasis in original).
113. Id. (emphasis in original). In support of this proposition Mr. Justice Douglas
quoted the language of NEPA section 102(2)(A) which requires all agencies to:

"utilize a systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the inte-

grated use of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts
in planning and in decisionmaking which may have an impact on man's environment."
Id. at 2361 n.2, quoting NEPA § 102(2)(A), 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(A) (1971) (emphasis in
opinion of Douglas, J.).
114. 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2361 (1975).
115. Id. at 2356, quoting NEPA § 102(2)(C), 49 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (1971).
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where an applicant's request for agency action has resulted in a
final decision by the agency. This interpretation of the Supreme
Court's holding would appear to affect only those classes of cases
in which the agency action consists of an approval or denial of an
applicant's request for permission to do a given act. It is clear that
when an agency initiates federal action, for instance proposed
construction of federal facilities, this constitutes a proposal and
an environmental impact statement must be prepared for inclusion in the proposal. The proposal as constituted must then be
subjected to the agency review process. In the case where an
agency reviews a request by an applicant for permission to do a
given act, however, no agency proposal exists until the time the
agency either grants or denies the requested permission. If this be
the ultimate interpretation of the Court's language in United
States v. SCRAP, it is difficult to determine how future courts
may insist on a thorough consideration of environmental factors
prior to an agency reaching a final decision either granting or
denying a request. Under this interpretation of the Supreme
Court's decision, what is the current effect of the frequentlyquoted language in Calvert Cliffs' which states that:"'
[If the decision was reached procedurally without individualized consideration and balancing of environmental factorsconducted fully and in good faith-it is the responsibility of
the courts to reverse.
It is to be recalled that to the extent that Calvert Cliffs', Greene
County, and Harlem Valley TransportationAssociation read the
requirement that the statement accompany the proposal through
the existing agency review process differently, the Supreme Court
11 7
stated that they would appear to be in conflict with the statute.
If it be deemed that consideration of environmental factors
sufficient to comply with NEPA may be undertaken so late in the
decisionmaking process, it is difficult to perceive how the fear
expressed by the Court in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.
Corps of Engineers"8 will not become a reality:"'
The unequivocal intent of NEPA is to require agencies to
consider and give effect to the environmental goals set forth in
116. 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
117. 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2356 n.20 (1975). See notes 83-86 supra and accompanying text.

118. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
119. Id. at 298.
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the Act, not just to file detailed impact studies which will fill
governmental archives.
Courts have consistently interpreted NEPA as requiring an
agency to consider environmental effects before it undertakes a
"major federal action." This is to be accomplished through the
preparation and consideration of an adequate environmental
impact statement. How an environmental statement can he
viewed as adequate and constituting a proper basis for agency
decisionmaking when a crucial analysis of environmental effects
is postponed until after the action is taken, is difficult to determine. Yet this is what the Supreme Court held in its finding that
the ICC's environmental impact statement was adequate.
Although this interpretation of the effect of the decision may
sound an ominous ring for those seeking to assure that agency
decisionmaking occurs after all the environmental consequences
of a given action are exposed, it is submitted that United States
v. SCRAP may be limited to the unique questions before the
Court in this case, i.e., reviewing the ICC's compliance with
NEPA in the context of general revenue proceedings. Where the
basic issue presented to the ICC is whether to permit a substantially across-the-board rate increase, the scope of the agency's
inquiry has historically been limited.
[U]nder the Louisiana case, the general rule has been that the
ICC may confine its attention in general revenue proceedings
almost entirely to the need for revenue and to any other factors
that relate to the legality of the general increase as a whole; and
it follows a fortiorithat if attention is given to other issues, that
attention may be of a limited nature.'
The Court noted that in certain instances circumstances
arise, such as across-the-board cost increases, which dictate an
increase in virtually all rates by a large number of railroads.
Recognizing the "practical problems" confronting the ICC in
such situations, the Court noted that the ICC has been permitted "to find the new rates lawful after taking proof relating not
to any particular rate but to the reasonableness of the increases
in general." ''
The Court cited the case of Algoma Coal & Coke Co. v.
120. 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2353 (1975).
121. Id. at 2352. In support of this proposition the Court cited New England Divs.
Case, 261 U.S. 184, 196-98 (1923).
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United States 2 as support for the proposition that the ICC in a
general revenue proceeding may decline to declare proposed rate
increases unlawful without assessing the merits of the increases
on specific commodities. In Algoma, shippers of coal sought review of the ICC's decision not to declare the proposed increase
unlawful insofar as it applied to coal. In declining to set aside the
rate increases the court indicated that the ICC's order
"prescribedno particular rates. It merely permitted the carriers
to file new rates without suspension.""'2 The court further
explained that the ICC had only decided that the railroad's revenue needs rendered the general increase reasonable and that the
ICC had not yet determined whether the increased rates on coal
specifically were just and reasonable. The court stated that the
proper procedure for challenging the justness and reasonableness
of a particular rate is by filing a complaint under section 13 of
the Interstate Commerce Act, 121 to seek a refund and a declara-

tion of unjustness or unreasonableness from the

ICC.125

The Supreme Court noted that since the Algoma decision,
attempts by shippers to undo a decision by the ICC in a general
revenue proceeding not to declare rate increases unlawful when
such challenge concerns a particular commodity "have been
uniformly unsuccessful."
In those cases in which a shipper claimed only that the increase
on a particular commodity was unjust or unreasonablewithout addressing the question whether a general increase of
some sort was justified-the courts have declined to rule on
the issue posed for the reason that the ICC had not yet addressed it. In those cases in which shippers have attacked the
ICC's decision that rate increases in general were justified, the
courts, going beyond the Algoma decision, have declined review
on the ground that the shipper had not exhausted his administrative remedies under §§ 13 and 15. [Citations omitted.]'
In the instant case the Supreme Court was faced with ICC
ratemaking procedures the validity and scope of which had been
clearly defined by extensive precedent. United States v.
Louisiana'7 expressed the general rule that the ICC may confine
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.

11 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Va. 1935).
Id. at 494 (emphasis in original).
49 U.S.C. § 13 (1971).
United States v. SCRAP, 95 S.Ct. 2336, 2353 (1975).
Id. at 2353-54 (emphasis in original).
290 U.S. 70 (1933).
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its attention in general revenue proceedings to issues related
mainly to the need for revenue, while Algoma supports the proposition that the ICC need not assess the reasonableness of any
particular rate in the context of a general revenue proceeding.
Given the "confined" decision rendered by the ICC in a general revenue proceeding and the existence of procedures whereby
further consideration of particular rates may be undertaken, it
may be argued that for purposes of compliance with the decisionmaking process mandated by NEPA, a distinction can be drawn
between ratemaking proceedings, such as those involved in the
instant case, and other agency action involving an approval or
denial of an applicant's request for permission to do a given act.
In the former case the agency action in a general revenue proceeding is not final with respect to given rates on specific commodities, whereas in other agency action involving the grant or denial
of approval, a decision by the agency is generally final. For this
reason it can be argued that environmental considerations must
be factored into the decisionmaking process earlier in those actions where the agency's determination is final.
In reaching its decision' pertaining to the adequacy of the
impact statement prepared by the ICC, the Supreme Court in
United States v. SCRAP referred to the nonfinal and "limited
nature of the decision made in Ex parte 281, "18 and that the
"federal action" involved in this case did not include an implicit
approval of the underlying rate structure. "The decision of the
lower court . . . to deem the federal action involved in Ex parte
281 to include an implicit approval of the underlying rate structure was inaccurate ...
I" In fact the Court implied that had
the ICC approved the entire rate structure in Ex parte No. 281
the result may have been different.
As Mr. Justice Douglas noted, the Court conceded the shortcomings of the Commission's analysis and relied heavily on the
fact that environmental issues would receive further study in the
proceeding already in progress which was investigating the entire
rate structure. 3 Had such an investigation not been underway,
it is probable that the Court's view of the adequacy of the impact
statement would have been different. The Court was struck by
the pointlessness of ordering the ICC to thoroughly explore the
128. United States v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2359 (1975).
129. Id. at 2358-59.
130. Id. at 2361.
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question of the discriminatory effect of the underlying rate structure on recyclables in Ex parte No. 281 when they were doing so
in the more appropriate context of Ex parte No. 270.
Furthermore, the Court found that environmental issues pervaded the proceeding and in fact far outweighed the financial
issues presumed to be controlling in general revenue proceedings.' 3 ' Given the fact that the railroads were experiencing a
financial crisis, that environmental issues pervaded the general
revenue proceeding, and the limited nature of the federal action
being taken in Ex parte No. 281, the Court determined that the
EIS prepared by the ICC was adequate. Thus, United States v.
SCRAP may be viewed narrowly as interpreting the question of
the ICC's compliance with NEPA in the context of a general
revenue proceeding with the question of the adequacy of the
ICC's environmental impact statement being determined in light
of the ongoing investigation into the environmental effects of the
ICC's underlying rate structure.
Courts reviewing agency compliance with the decisionmaking process mandated by NEPA may find that while the procedural requirements have been met, the purpose of NEPA has
been frustrated. In such cases courts may review substantive
agency decisions on the merits.
PART TWO
VI.

SUBSTANTIVE REVIEW UNDER

NEPA

One of the "continuing responsibilities" of the federal government under NEPA is to use "all practicable means" to "enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable resources." ' 2 Since the
district court in SCRAP found the ICC's efforts to comply with
NEPA's procedural commands to be "sorely deficient,' 33 the
issue of whether the Commission gave insufficient weight to this
environmental value in reaching its conclusion that the general
increase was justified, was not reached. Therefore, the appeal to
the Supreme Court did not involve reviewability of the substantive issues decided by the ICC at the general revenue proceed34
ing.
131.
132.
133.
134.

Id. at 2359.
42 U.S.C. §§ 4331(b), (b)(6) (1971).
371 F. Supp. 1291, 1299 (D.D.C. 1974).
The Court in United States v. SCRAP, 95 S. Ct. 2336, 2354-55 n.18 (1975) noted
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The principal focus of the courts in reviewing agency compliance with NEPA has been on the procedural requirements imposed under the Act, which directs federal agencies to prepare an
environmental impact statement when they propose any major
action which may have a significant effect on the environment.'35
Courts have enjoined numerous federal projects pending completion of an adequate EIS.'35 The Act has also been interpreted as
imposing a new, broader decisionmaking process on federal agencies in that they are now obliged to consider environmental consequences.
That NEPA contains a substantive mandate is clear from a
reading of the Act. Yet judicial recognition of a substantive restraint on agency action has been slow. Decisions interpreting
NEPA often have held that the Act does not create judicially
enforceable substantive rights, and that only when an agency
fails to comply with the procedural duties imposed by section 102
is their action subject to challenge. It has been held that if the
agency considered environmental factors in good faith, NEPA
imposes no restrictions on the agency's ultimate decision' 3
The text of the Act, however, clearly indicates that federal
agencies must adhere to substantive constraints as well. Section
Part of NEPA provides that "the policies, regulations, and public laws of the
United States shall be interpreted and administered in accordance with the
policies set forth in this chapter," 42 U.S.C. § 4332(1); and one of the policies
of the chapter is to "approach the maximum attainable recycling of depletable
resources." The District Court expressly declined to review the question whether
the ICC ultimately "gave insufficient weight to this environmental value" in
reaching its conclusion that the general increase was justified. Therefore, this
appeal does not involve reviewability of those substantive issues, including environmental issues, decided by the ICC at the general revenue proceedings.
135. The requirement that an EIS be prepared applies only to "major Federal actions
significantly affecting the quality of the human environment." NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42
U.S.C. 4332(2)(C) (1971). The courts, however, have not held that a "minor" federal
action, the environmental effects of which are significant, is immune from the requirement

that an EIS be prepared. See F.

ANDERSON,

NEPA

IN THE COURTS

74, 89-96 (1973), and

cases cited therein.
136. See, e.g., Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 458 F.2d 827 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); National Helium Corp. v. Morton, 455 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1971); Ely v. Velde,
451 F.2d 1130 (4th Cir. 1971); 1-291 Why? Ass'n v. Bums, 372 F. Supp. 223 (D. Conn.
1974); Duck River Preservation Ass'n v. TVA, 6 E.R.C. 1789 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); Committee to Stop Route 7 v. Volpe, 346 F. Supp. 731 (D. Conn. 1972); Environmental Defense
Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
137. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 759
(E.D. Ark. 1971). See also Committee for Nuclear Responsibility v. Seaborg, 463 F.2d 783
(D.C. Cir. 1971); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 342 F. Supp. 1211
(E.D. Ark. 1971); Sierra Club v. Harden, 325 F. Supp. 99 (D. Alas. 1971).
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101(a) of NEPA states a national policy:'35
The Congress ... declares that it is the continuing policy
of the Federal government . . . to create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements
of present and future generations of Americans.
Section 101(b) states that it is the "continuing responsibility of
the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent
with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve
and coordinate Federal plans" and programs to achieve several
enumerated environmental goals.'39 Section 102 of NEPA, viewed
as embracing the "action-forcing""I procedures by which the na138. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(a) (1971). Section 101(a) provides in full:
The Congress, recognizing the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components of the natural environment, particularly the profound
influences of population growth, high density urbanization, industrial expansion, resource exploitation, and new and expanding technological advances and
recognizing further the critical importance of restoring and maintaining environmental quality to the overall welfare and development of man, declares that
it is the continuing policy of the Federal Government, in cooperation with State
and local governments, and other concerned public and private organizations,
to use all practicable means and measures, including financial and technical
assistance, in a manner calculated to foster and promote the general welfare, to
create and maintain conditions under which man and nature can exist in productive harmony, and fulfill the social, economic, and other requirements of
present and future generations of Americans.
Id.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1971). Section 101(b) provides in full:
In order to carry out the policy set forth in this chapter, it is the continuing
responsibility of the Federal Government to use all practicable means, consistent with other essential considerations of national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources to the end that the
Nation may(1) fulfill the responsibilities of each generation as trustee of the environment
for succeeding generations;
(2) assure for all Americans safe, healthful, productive, and esthetically and
culturally pleasing surroundings;
(3) attain the widest range of beneficial uses of the environment without degradation, risk to health or safety, or other undesirable and unintended consequences;
(4) preserve important historic, cultural, and natural aspects of our national
heritage, and maintain, wherever possible, an environment which supports diversity and variety of individual choice;
(5) achieve a balance between population and resource use which will permit
high standards of living and a wide sharing of life's amenities; and
(6) enhance the quality of renewable resources and approach the maximum
attainable recycling of depletable resources.
Id.
140. See Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d. 1123, 1132
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tional policy expressed in section 101 may be implemented, requires the preparation of the environmental impact statement by
federal agencies.'
Declarations of legislative intent support the interpretation
that the Act creates a substantive mandate. According to the
Senate Report, the purpose of NEPA4 2
is to establish, by Congressional action, a national policy to
guide Federal activities which are involved with or related to the
management of the environment or which have an impact on the
quality of the environment.
Thus, conflicts between environmental goals and other national values were to be resolved in looking to the national policy
enunciated in NEPA. "Federal action must rest upon a clear
statement of values and goals which we seek; in short, a national
14 3
environmental policy."
Recognizing the need for congressional supervision of agency
Report quoted from the Senate Comdecisionmaking, the Senate
4
mittee on the Judiciary:
Policy making is not a function that can be performed properly by a small group of appointed officials, no matter how able
or well intentioned. Only in Congress, where the members are
directly answerable to the electorate, can compelling political
interests be adequately represented and properly accommodated.
VII.

JUDICIAL RECOGNITION OF SUBSTANTIVE

REVIEW

The first judicial recognition of NEPA's substantive mandate was by the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia in
Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingCommittee v. AEC,' a case involv& n.13 (5th Cir. 1974); S. REP. supra note 35, at 9; Note, The Least Adverse Alternative
Approach to Substantive Review Under NEPA, 88 HARv. L. REV. 735, 737 (1975)
[hereinafter cited as The Least Adverse Alternative Approach].
141. For an examination of the interrelation between sections 101 and 102, see Cohen
& Warren, JudicialRecognition of the Substantive Requirements of the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 685 (1972); Note, Substantive
Review Under the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act; EDFv. Corps of Engineers,3 ECOL.
L.Q. 173, 183 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Substantive Review]; The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 739.
142. S. REP., supra note 35, at 8; 115 CONG. REc. 19009 (1969) (remarks of Senator
Jackson).
143. S. REP., supra note 35, at 13.
144. Id.
145. 449 F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). A recent case decided by the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia affirmed the holdings in Calvert Cliffs' that

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 1976

37

Hofstra Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 2 [1976], Art. 2

Hofstra Law Review

[Vol. 4, 1976]

ing the adequacy of the AEC regulations implementing NEPA.
Judge Skelly Wright, writing for the court, stated that sec' requiring
tion 101 sets forth a "substantive mandate"146
agencies
to consider environmental factors. The court reasoned that to
properly consider environmental factors a balancing process
would have to be utilized wherein the environmental costs of a
project would be compared to its economic and technical benefits. Holding that courts may exact strict compliance with
NEPA's procedures, 4 ' Judge Wright concluded that a reviewing
court could reverse an agency decision on the merits, but, he
stated it must be shown under section 101 "that the actual balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly
gave insufficient weight to environmental values."''
Thus
Calvert Cliffs' makes a clearstatement that NEPA creates a
substantive mandate and that judicial supervision of that mandate is proper.
The reasoning expressed in Calvert Cliffs' was later adopted
by the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit in Environmental
Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers."I Applying the Calvert
Cliffs' standard, the court determined that Section 101 of NEPA
created a judicially enforceable substantive standard. 510 By so
deciding, the Eighth Circuit became the first federal court to
squarely hold that NEPA embraced a substantive mandate to
federal agencies which is enforceable through judicial review on
the merits.
The dispute in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Engineers arose out of the proposed construction of Gillham
Dam on the Cassatot River in Arkansas. Part of a massive flood
control plan authorized by Congress in the Flood Control Act of
1958,'15 work on the project commenced in 1963 and was nearly
two-thirds complete at a cost of 9.8 million dollars at the commencement of litigation. However, the dam itself had not been
started. The litigation extended over a period of two years during
which six memorandum opinions were filed by the district
"NEPA's substantive provisions may be enforced in court as well as its procedural requisites." Sierra Club v. Morton, 514 F.2d 856, 874 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
146. 449 F.2d 1109, 1112-13 n.5.
147. Id. at 1115.
148. Id.
149. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
150. Id. at 300. For a thorough discussion of the case, its history, and implications,
see Substantive Review, supra note 141.
151. 33 U.S.C. § 701 (1971).
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court.'52 In its sixth memorandum opinion the court concluded

that the amended impact statement submitted by the defendants
met the full disclosure requirements of NEPA.'55 Finding that the
Corps had made a good faith effort to comply with NEPA, and
also finding an absence of intentional misrepresentation in the
withholding of pertinent facts, the district court determined that
the defendant had discharged its statutory duty and dismissed
the case. 154
In the appeal taken from the district court decision, the
plaintiffs alleged bias, factual inaccuracies, a failure to develop
appropriate alternatives, and that the decision of the Corps to
build a dam should be reviewed on the merits.155 Although the
court of appeals held that the EIS finally submitted by the Corps
fully disclosed the information required by section 102(2)(C) (and
the alternatives required by section 102(2)(D)), and that therefore the Corps had complied in good faith with NEPA's procedural commands,'58 it upheld the contention raised by the EDF
that the decision to construct the dam was reviewable on the
merits. The district court had rejected plaintiff's claim that,
based on section 101, NEPA creates a substantive standard. The
57
court of appeals responded:

We disagree. The language of NEPA, as well as its legislative history, make it clear that the Act is more than an environmental full-disclosure law. NEPA was intended to effect substantive changes in decisionmaking. Section 101(b) of the Act
states that agencies have an obligation "to use all practical
[sic] means, consistent with other essential considerations of
national policy, to improve and coordinate Federal plans, functions, programs, and resources" to preserve and enhance the
environment. To this end, § 101 sets out specific environmental
goals to serve as a set of policies to guide agency action affecting
the environment.
152. The six memorandum opinions filed by the district court dealt with venue,
jurisdiction, sufficiency of the complaint, appropriateness of an injunction, and the application of NEPA to ongoing projects. See Substantive Review, supra note 141, at 178.
Opinions One through Four are reported at 325 F. Supp. 728 (E.D. Ark. 1971), Opinion
Five at 325 F. Supp. 749 (E.D. Ark. 1971), and Opinion Six at 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D.
Ark. 1972).
153. 342 F. Supp. 1211 (E.D. Ark. 1972).
154. Id. at 1218.
155. 470 F.2d 289, 294-97 (8th Cir. 1972).
156. Id. at 295-97.
157. Id. at 297-98.
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Given an agency obligation to carry out the substantive
requirements of the Act, we believe that courts have an obligation to review substantive agency decisions on the merits.
Once it has been determined that the agency acted within
the scope of its authority, the circuit court declared, the reviewing
court must then establish "whether the decision reached was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion or otherwise not in
accordance with law.""'5 In making this assessment the court
must ascertain if the agency considered all relevant factors or if
the decision itself represented a clear error of judgment.
Where NEPA is involved, the reviewing court must first
determine if the agency reached its decision after a full, good
faith consideration and balancing of environmental factors. The
court must then determine, according to the standards set forth
in §§ 101(b) and 102(1) of the Act, whether "the actual balance
of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or clearly
gave insufficient weight to environmental values." [Citation
omitted.]"9

The test laid down by the Eighth Circuit requires a reviewing
court to scrutinize an agency's reasoning and value judgments to
ascertain whether the ultimate decision rendered implements the
substantive requirements of section 101.
The court then measured the Corps' decision to build the
Gillham Dam against the arbitrary and capricious standard and
concluded that even if all of the factual disputes were to be resolved in favor of the plaintiffs, the Corps' decision must be upheld.'60 The court, in making its decision, relied on the statutory
language of NEPA, the Administrative Procedure Act's presumption of reviewability, and the judicial authority of Calvert
Cliffs'.'6 ' While the Eighth Circuit's adoption of the cost-benefit
analysis for substantive review has apparently been accepted by
the Council on Environmental Quality, ' 2 (the organization most
158. Id. at 300.
159. Id.
160. In reaching this conclusion the court, applying a cost-benefit analysis, relied
heavily on the advanced stage of the project and the previous investment of nearly 10
million dollars. Id. at 301.
161. The court cited several other cases which failed to clearly advocate the scope of
substantive review suggested by its decision. Id. at 299 n.15. The court also relied on Judge
Oake's dissenting opinion in Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. FPC, 453 F.2d
463, 482 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 407 U.S. 926 (1972).

162. See U.S.

COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALrrY, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT

225, 244

(1972).
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closely concerned with NEPA's implementation 63' ) and by courts
in several circuits," 4 the utilization of the cost-benefit analysis in
the environmental arena is fraught with difficulties.
VIII.

COST-BENEFIT ANALYSIS

A major problem which arises in any attempt to use a costbenefit approach to balance environmental harms against a project's benefits is the difficulty of evaluating environmental costs.
Since NEPA does not state what weight environmental factors
should receive in the equation balancing harms against benefits,
and given the fact that a satisfactory method for evaluating environmental costs has not been forthcoming from the scientific sector, 5 a court reviewing agency action against NEPA's substantive standard is presented with a weighty chore. When confronted
with a choice between the preservation of a given environmental
resource and the alleviation of an economic crisis such as widespread unemployment, in the absence of specific weight being
assigned for such variables, how can a reviewing court determine
if an agency in balancing the benefits and costs of a project
"clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values[?]" It
appears that a judge must measure an agency's compliance with
the substantive mandate of NEPA by using his or her own judgment on whether the environmental costs of a given project are
outweighed by its benefits. 6 '
163. NEPA §§ 201-07, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4341-47 (1970).
164. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 492 F.2d 1123
(5th Cir. 1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973); Conservation Council v. Froehlke, 473 F.2d 664 (4th Cir. 1973).
Most commentators have reached the conclusion that NEPA imposes duties which
reach the substance of agency decisions. See, e.g., Arnold, The Substantive Right to
Environmental Quality Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 3 E.L.R. 50028
(1973); Briggs, NEPA as a Means to Preserve and Improve the Environment-The Substantive Review, 15 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 699 (1974); Cohen & Warren, Judicial
Recognition of the Substantive Requirements of the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act
of 1969, 13 B.C. IND. & CoM. L. REV. 685 (1972); Robie, Recognition of Substantive Rights
Under NEPA, 7 NATURAL REsOURCEs LAW. 387 (1974); Comment, The Role of the Courts
Under the National Environmental Policy Act, 23 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 300 (1973);
Substantive Review, supranote 141; The Least Adverse AlternativeApproach, supra note
140.
165. See Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1365 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on
other g:ounds sub nom. Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974). See also
U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY, FOURTH ANNUAL REPORT 110 (1973); Tribe,
Ways Not to Think About Plastic Trees: New Foundationsfor Environmental Law, 83
YALE L.J. 1315, 1320 (1974).
166. See Leventhal, EnvironmentalDecisionmaking and the Role of the Courts, 122
U. PA. L. REV. 509, 529 (1974); Substantive Review, supra note 141, at 203, 204.
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Given the range that exists in calculating a project's costs
and benefits and the agency's facility in altering the variables to
guarantee a result supporting its project, it is incumbent upon a
reviewing court to exercise the utmost care in analyzing agency
calculations which evaluate and balance benefits against costs.
One variable which is highly flexible is the selection of an
appropriate discount rate. The discount rate is the vehicle used
to express society's preference to consume in the present rather
than in the future. Just as financial institutions use a discount
rate to approximate the present worth of money to be received in
the future, it is used in cost-benefit analysis to estimate the present significance of future effects of a project.
The government of a society must determine the manner of
allocating its resources over time, choosing whether to invest in
projects benefiting people of future generations rather than people in the near future. Since many of the taxpayers of today who
bear the cost of an agency's projects will be unable to enjoy the
future benefits, the agency discounts the future costs and benefits
to a present value. The lower the discount rate, the higher the
present value of benefits in the distant future. By use of a low
discount rate, an agency can inflate its benefit/cost ratios by
67
placing a low priority on the needs of the present generations.'
167. R. BERKMAN & W. Viscusi, THE NADER REPORT, DAMMING THE WEST 83-84 (1973).

An agency which has consistently used a low discount rate, thereby inflating its benefitcost ratios, is the Bureau of Reclamation. The discount rates used by the Bureau between
1959 and 1969 varied between 21/ and 314 percent.
Discount Rates Used in
Reclamation Feasibility Studies
Fiscal Year

Discount Rate

1959
1960
1961
1962

2.5
2.5
2.5
21/s
27/
3
314
314,
31/
3 /4
31/

1963

1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969

4% *

1970
1971

4-/
51/

* This increase was due to the Water Resources Council's issuing of new procedures
for setting discount rates.
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Thus, minor changes in the discount rate may have dramatic
effects in the resulting cost-benefit analysis. Other factors which
are easily manipulated by an agency seeking to justify its project
are the estimated life span of a project and overvaluing one factor
or undervaluing another thereby creating inaccurate comparisons
of project benefits and costs.
Sierra Club v, Froehlke'68 represents the most extensive judicial examination to date of the Corps of Engineers' cost-benefit
procedures under NEPA. Finding that the Corps failed to comply
with the procedural requirements of NEPA in reviewing its proposed $29 million Wallisville reservoir project, the court did not
have to rely on the deficiencies exposed in the Corps' cost-benefit
analysis. Nevertheless, the court noted that a review of the record
and the EIS indicated that "the balance struck was 'arbitrary'
and 'clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values,'"
Id. at 229 (Appendix Table 4-A).
In 1962, Senate Document 97 . . . was approved . . . . This document
revised the procedure for determining the discount rate. The new procedure
called for the discount rate to be "based on the average rate of interest payable
by the Treasury on interest bearing marketable securities of the United States
outstanding at the end of the fiscal year preceding such computation which,
upon original issue, had terms to maturity of 15 years or more."
Id. at 85, quoting POLICIES, STANDARDS AND PROCEDURES IN THE FORMULATION, EVALUATION,
AND REVIEW OF PLANS FOR USE AND DEVELOPMENT OF WATER AND RELATED LAND RESOURCES,

S. Doc. No. 97, 87th Cong., 2d. Sess. 12 (1962). Completed studies and studies which had
already begun were exempt from the provision. The discount rate arrived at under this
method was still below the value it should have been since it required interest rates on
all long-term government bonds with over 15 years to maturity from the date of issue to
be averaged, thereby permitting rates on government bonds with merely one or two years
before their due dates (with their typically low interest rates) to be included in the
discount rate average. NADER REPORT at 86. The discount rate thus was too low to bear
any reasonable relationship to the opportunity cost of capital. Id., citing Interview by W.
Kip Viscusi with David Flipse, Chief of the Bureau of Reclamation, Economics Branch,
June 24, 1970.
This situation was sought to be rectified in 1968 when the Water Resources Council
revised the discount rate procedures by including in the average for purposes of setting
the discount rate all long-terrh Treasury Bonds that would fall due 15 years or more from
today rather than from their date of issue. NADER REPORT at 87.
It has been maintained that the proper method for determining the discount rate
would reflect the opportunity cost of private spending using a long-term private riskless
interest rate. NADER'REPORT at 87. In arriving at this conclusion, the Joint Economic
Committee's Subcommittee on Economy in Government reasoned that such a discount
rate would "preclude the displacement of private investments more profitable then Bureau projects." Id. at 88, quoting SUBCOMM. ON ECONOMY IN GOVERNMENT OF THE JOINT
ECONOMIC COMM., 90th CONG., 2d SEss., REPORT ON ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PUBLIC INVESTMENT DECISIONS: INTEREST RATE POLICY AND DISCOUNTING ANALYSIS 10 (1968). Used in this
fashion, the discount rate would serve the purpose of eliminating those projects in which
benefits do not exceed costs.
168. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
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quoting the Calvert Cliffs' test as adopted by the Eighth Circuit. ' Although the Corps of Engineers usually uses a 50-year
life span in its computations, during the early planning stage of
the project the cost-benefit ratio was computed on a projected
100-year life span. When the estimated life span was halved, the
benefit-to-cost ratio dropped below what was necessary to make
the project environmentally acceptable. Furthermore, the court
noted that the Corps had emphasized a per-year benefit of freshwater commercial fishing amounting to $29,000 while failing to
take into account an estimated annual loss in salt-water commercial fishing of $500,000.7 °
Similar cost-benefit abuse in under-calculation of environmental costs and overestimation of project benefits was apparent
in Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers. 71 In
arriving at the benefit-cost ratio the Corps referred to the future
creation of outdoor recreational benefits as a result of the damming while making no effort to determine whether the dam might
cause any recreational losses by destroying the stream recreation
offered by the Cossatot as a free-flowing river. Thus, by failing
to take into account the cost factor of losing stream recreation,
the Corps had overstated the net recreational benefits with the
17
result being a distorted benefit-cost ratio. 1
Another significant shortcoming of the cost-benefit analysis
in the environmental context is the difficulty inherent in determining precisely what environmental effects are likely to occur as
a result of a given project. Such a controversy developed in the
case of Reserve Mining Co. v. United States.17 At issue in Reserve
Mining was the public health impact of the taconite tailings
being discharged by Reserve's plant into the waters of Lake Superior and its dust emissions into the air surrounding the plant.
The plaintiffs argued, and the district court found, that these
discharges substantially endangered the health of the residents in
several communities around Lake Superior. 74 After 139 days of
trial which included testimony from over 100 witnesses, over
1,621 exhibits, and over 18,000 pages of transcript, the district
169. Id. at 1364.

170. Id. at 1362-81.
171. 470 F.2d 289 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).

172. The district court admonished the Corps for its failure to determine whether
the dam might result in recreational losses. Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps
of Eng'rs, 325 F. Supp. 749, 757-60 (E.D. Ark. 1971).
173. 498 F.2d 1073 (8th Cir. 1974).
174. United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 6 E.R.C. 1449 (D. Minn. 1974).
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court found that the fibers discharged by Reserve were either
identical or similar to amosite asbestos, that exposure to these
fibers can produce asbestosis, mesothelioma and cancer of the
lung, gastrointestinal tract, and larynx, and hence substantially
endangered the health of the people in the areas around the
plant and those procuring their water from certain areas of Lake
Superior. On the basis of this public health hazard the court
found a common law nuisance and ordered that such discharges
from Reserve be immediately enjoined."'
In reviewing whether Reserve's discharges and emissions created a common law nuisance, the Court of Appeals for the Eighth
Circuit determined that the evidence did not support a finding
of a substantial health hazard and hence stayed the district
court's injunction.' 76 By permitting Reserve to continue discharging its tailings into the water and air, the court of appeals
allowed what the district court found to be "[a] situation where
a commercial industry is daily exposing thousands of 7people to
substantial quantities of a known human carcinogen."
A court's task of determining the exact nature of the environmental effects which are likely to occur is extremely difficult.
Evaluating those effects in monetary terms, when coupled with
the latitude that exists in identifying and measuring project costs
and benefits and the ease with which agencies can manipulate the
variables, renders judicial review of agency compliance with the
substantive mandate of NEPA through analysis of the agency's
cost-benefit balancing nearly an impossibility. If sorting through
this maze of variables in an effort to determine if "the actual
balance of costs and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or
clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values" appears to be a responsibility difficult to discharge, a look at court
action utilizing the Calvert Cliffs'-EDF formulation lends credence to the weightiness of this task. A review of the case law
reveals that in those instances in which a court reviewed an
agency decision on the merits under NEPA using the Calvert
Cliffs'-EDFtest, the action has been allowed to proceed. 7 '
A recent law review note concluded that a close examination
175. Id. at 1449-53.
176. Reserve Mining Co. v. United States, 498 F.2d 1073, 1082-84 (8th Cir. 1974).
177. 6 E.R.C. 1449, 1450 (D. Minn. 1974).
178. See, e.g., Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Callaway, 497 F.2d 1340 (8th Cir.
1974); Sierra Club v. Froehlke, 486 F.2d 946 (7th Cir. 1973); Environmental Defense Fund,
Inc. v. Corps of Eng'rs, 470 F.2d 289, 301 (8th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 931 (1973).
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of NEPA's section 101 indicates that the Calvert Cliffs'-EDFformulation fails to properly implement the intent of the statute.'7 9
In searching for a coherent framework within which agencies and
courts may more effectively discharge their responsibilities under
NEPA, the note suggested "the least adverse alternative ap' 80
proach to substantive review under NEPA.'
IX.

THE LEAST ADVERSE ALTERNATIVE APPROACH TO SUBSTANTIVE
REVIEW UNDER

NEPA

In setting forth a framework for substantive review under
NEPA, the note focused on the language of section 101(b) which
declares that the federal government must "use all practicable
means, consistent with other essential considerations of national
policy,"' 8 ' to further a number of environmental goals. Stating
that this command "directs agencies to do all they can to protect
the environment within two constraints-that environmental
protection be both 'consistent with other essential considerations
of national policy' and 'practicable,'" the note concluded that
the propriety of substantive review under NEPA will depend on
whether "judicially manageable standards may be derived from
these two terms . ... '182
Examining first the "consistency" element and finding that
section 101 does not require that protection of the environment
always be of paramount importance in reaching a decision on
projects implementing essential national policies, the note reasoned:' 3
179. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supranote 140, at 747. In justification
of his adoption of a cost-benefit standard in Calvert Cliffs; Judge Wright relied upon
NEPA's legislative history, focusing on one of Senator Jackson's statements which "specifically recognized the requirement of a balancing judgment." Id., quoting Calvert Cliffs'
Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1113 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The author of the
note argued that Senator Jackson's statement "does not necessarily [support] a costbenefit approach. For example, adverse environmental effects might be justified by the
satisfaction of other needs, such as national security, that are so fundamental that they
must prevail without regard to environmental costs." Id.
The force of this legislative history is questionable given the fact that "after the
Calvert Cliffs' decision Senator Jackson asked the Council on Environmental Quality
whether it interpreted NEPA to require cost-benefit analysis." Id., at 747 n.77. See Hearings on the Calvert Cliffs' Court DecisionBefore the Senate Comm. on Interiorand Insular
Affairs, 92d Cong., Ist Sess., Ser. 92-14, pt. 1, at 37-38 (1971); id. pt. 2, at 389.
180. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 735.
181. Id. at 748, quoting NEPA § 101(b); 42 U.S.C. § 4331(b) (1971).
182. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 748.
183. Id. at 748-49.
The note cited as an example of the difference between the standard postulated and
the cost-benefit approach, proposed construction of a dam for purposes of flood control.
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Rather, it requires only that [environmental] measures be consistent with some means of implementing the broad policies
... .Where the only means of implementing a national policy
is a project that is environmentally unsound, NEPA does not
preclude it. So long as environmentally preferable alternatives
to a proposed project are available, however, section 101(b) requires that the least adverse alternative be selected.
The author explained that the basic difference between this
standard and the cost-benefit approach is that the former may
permit approval of a project whose environmental costs exceed its
economic benefits. Furthermore, under cost-benefit analysis it is
suggested that a project might be allowed despite the existence
of less adverse alternatives." 4
Turning then to the NEPA requirement that environmental
measures be "practicable," the author noted the difficulties involved in interpreting this provision. 18 5 In support of the proposition that an alternative to a project proposal could be practicable
even though environmental considerations might increase costs,
the author quoted from the legislative history of the Act: "The
costs of air and water pollution, poor land-use policies and urban
decay can no longer be deferred for payment by future generations."8 6
The note suggested application of a "cost-effectiveness"
standard to each alternative. Under this approach, which the
author indicates is cost-benefit analysis applied to individual alternatives,17 an alternative to a project would be practicable if
"the environmental cost it alleviates is greater than or equal to
the additional expenditures it demands." '88 For situations other
[A] suitable alternative to the construction of a flood-control dam might be the
expansion of an existing facility. Although both projects might pass an environmental cost-benefit test, the least adverse alternative approach to NEPA would
prohibit the new dam if the expansion project were environmentally superior.
Id. at 749 (footnotes omitted).
184. Id.
185. Id. at 750-51. The author rejects the idea advanced in Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971), that an alternative might be practicable "so
long as it is technologically feasible." The Least Adverse AlternativeApproach, supra note
140, at 751. Rather, it is suggested that costs must be taken into account because to not
do so "could sacrifice essential national needs to environmental concerns ....

"

Id. at

752.
186. S. REP., supra note 35, at 5, as quoted in The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 751.
187. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 752.
188. Id.
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than the obvious case of cost-effectiveness where an alternative
adds no additional costs and is environmentally preferable, the
author suggested adoption of a "reasonable increment approach"
whereby "rules of thumb" might be developed by the courts to
determine in which cases it is reasonable to require additional
expenditure in order to alleviate environmental damage." '
A question concerning NEPA's requirement that measures
taken for environmental protection be "practicable," left unanswered by the least adverse alternative approach, is "whether an
agency must defer to alternatives that are beyond its authority
to implement.""' NEPA requires federal agencies to coordinate
their programs in an effort to avoid environmental harm thereby
suggesting "that the least adverse alternatives to which NEPA's
substantive mandate requires an agency to defer are not limited
to those that lie within its own authority."' 9 ' However, the author
explains that NEPA mandates an actual choice of alternatives
only on a showing of practicability.
Where the least adverse alternative to an agency's proposed
project may be implemented only by a second agency of the
government, the practicability of the alternative is not solely a
function of the additional cost it imposes. Instead, it will depend
on the likelihood that the second agency will proceed with the
alternative and the length of time the second agency will require to make its decision.' 92
NEPA's requirement of coordination among agencies would
seem to compel the first agency to encourage the second agency
to adopt the least adverse alternative, and the second to implement the alternative in the absence of unusual administrative
burdens or a disruption of agency planning processes. However,
an indication by the second agency that a decision to implement
the alternative is doubtful (or will not be forthcoming for a length
of time) might well render a least adverse alternative impracticable even if it were clearly over-effective.' 93
X.

MITGATION AND JUSTIFICATION

Whether the least adverse alternative approach adds more
189. Id. at 753-54.
190. Id. at 750.

191. Id. at 754. See Sax, The (Unhappy) Truth About NEPA, 26 OKLA. L. REv. 239,
245 (1973).

192. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 755.
193. Id.

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol4/iss2/2

48

Nolan: The National Environmental Policy Act after United States v. Scra

National Environmental Policy Act
than new terms to existing concepts relating to substantive review is questionable. The author concedes that a judicial analysis
of NEPA was advanced in Sierra Club v. Froehlke,'94 which differs little from the least adverse alternative approach."' In that
case, the court interpreted section 101(b) of NEPA and concluded
that "under some circumstances federal agencies must mitigate
some and possibly all of the environmental impacts arising from
a proposed project.""1 6 The author states that while the court's
analysis is phrased in terms of mitigation, "an analysis of alternatives beyond modifications of the proposed project is necessary to
the selection of the proper means of mitigating environmental
harms."'9 7 The similarity between the analyses is apparent.
The court in Sierra Club noted, however, "[i]t may well be
difficult as a practical matter for the courts to determine where
mere consideration of an alternative is sufficient as contrasted
with when actual mitigation is required."'98 To the extent that
this determination is a function of the substantive requirement
in NEPA that agency actions defer only to "practicable" alternatives, the analysis set forth in the note, assessing boundaries for
determining "practicability," may offer some guidance to the
courts in defining the substantive mandate.'99
Using the mitigation approach, a court reviewing an EIS for
a proposed agency action would look at whether there had been
consideration of those "practicable" alternatives which would
mitigate harm to the environment. Agency approval of a project,
absent any attempt to implement mitigation measures disclosed
in the EIS, should alert the court to a violation of the substantive
mandate of section 101 of NEPA. By reviewing agency decisions
requiring mitigation of environmental impacts arising from a proposed project via selection of the least adverse alternative, the
courts would have gone far in breathing life into the substantive
mandate of NEPA.
The court in Silva v. Lynn"'0 interpreted NEPA's EIS requirement to necessitate justification for the agency's decision.
By holding that "the agency must go beyond mere assertions and
194. 359 F. Supp. 1289 (S.D. Tex. 1973), rev'd on othergroundssub nom. Sierra Club
v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir. 1974).
195. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 749-50.
196. 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1339 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
197. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 750.
198. 359 F. Supp. 1289, 1345 (S.D. Tex. 1973).
199. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 750-54.
200. 482 F.2d 1282 (1st Cir. 1973).
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indicate its basis for them, '2 ' the court appears to have reviewed
the adequacy of the EIS in a manner which approximates sub2°2
stantive review. The court determined:
We think it is not too much to ask that the problem be fully
depicted, that HUD describe the approach that was taken, and
the reasons why the particular mode of control was chosen in
preference to others.
By requiring an EIS to disclose alternatives and to justify the
selection of its proposal over the alternatives noted, review of the
EIS for adequacy blurs with a review of the agency's decision on
the merits. To the extent that the justification offered by an
agency to support the adoption of its project is found inadequate
in that it fails to conform to the court's view of what is proper,
substantive review of the agency's decision on the merits has
occurred.03
XI.

CONCLUSION

In reviewing agency decisions on the merits, the courts may
adopt the cost-benefit approach set forth in Calvert Cliffs' and
Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corp of Engineers, reversing agency action on a showing that the actual balance of costs
and benefits that was struck was arbitrary or "clearly gave insufficient weight to environmental values. 2 4 Assessing the accuracy
of the agency's cost-benefit analysis is an onerous task given the
difficulty of determining the extent and value of environmental
harms that an agency action will cause.
Section 102(2)(B), however, directs agencies to develop
"methods and procedures" to "insure that presently unquantified
environmental amenities and values may be given appropriate
consideration in decisionmaking along with economic and technical considerations."20' Accurate quantification of environmental
data is essential if the cost-benefit analysis is to be an effective
tool for comparing project costs and benefits.0 6 That the current
state of the art does not lend itself to easy estimation of the type
201. Id. at 1287.

202. Id. at 1285.
203. The Least Adverse Alternative Approach, supra note 140, at 740 n.31.
204. Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm. v. AEC, 449 F.2d 1109, 1115 (D.C. Cir.
1971).
205, 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(B) (1971).
206. See Note, Evolving JudicialStandardsunder the National EnvironmentalPolicy Act and the Challenge of the Alaska Pipeline, 81 YALE L.J. 1592, 1600 (1972).
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and degree of environmental impacts or assigning monetary values to them, does not justify a laxity in progressing in this area.
NEPA's section 102(2)(B) direction to develop methodologies for
the quantification of environmental values demonstrates a full
commitment to improving the state of the art in environmental
appraisal. Perhaps the courts' task in reviewing an agency's costbenefit analyses would be facilitated, pending perfection of environmental measuring techniques, if the Natural Resources Defense Council's (NRDC) suggestion were followed. The NRDC
proposed that an agency using a cost-benefit analysis should
"specify the premises on which the analysis is based, including
theoretical assumptions, analytic techniques, and data sources,
21
so that independent evaluation of such decisions can be made.1 1
Given the facility with which agencies can alter the factors
that enter into the cost-benefit analysis, the courts should closely
scrutinize such factors as the choice of discount rates and the
estimated lifespan of the project. The courts should also pay close
attention to the characterization of specific recreational or commercial benefits and costs ascribed to a given project, for an
overvaluing of one factor or an undervaluing of another may cre2 8
ate inaccurate comparisons of costs and benefits.
Whether in reviewing agency decisions on the merits the
courts utilize the cost-benefit approach, the least adverse alternative approach, or require the agency to justify its decision and
mitigate the environmental impacts arising from a proposed project, it is imperative that agency action under NEPA is not entirely committed to agency discretion. It must be remembered
that in general, agencies owe their existence to the need to accomplish a given end, and therefore, cannot always be impartial. "' If
"important legislative purposes, heralded in the halls of Congress
are not [to be] lost or misdirected in the vast hallways of the
federal bureaucracy, ' 210 independent review of agency imple207. Comment, Calvert Cliffs' CoordinatingComm., Inc. v. A.E. C. and the Require-

ment of Balancing Under NEPA, 2 E.L.R. 10003, 10005 (1972).
208. For a description of the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation's
infamous history of overestimating project benefits and underestimating costs see Tarlock
& Tippy, The Wild and Scenic Rivers Act of 1968, 55 CORNELL L. REV. 707, 708-09 (1970).
See also Note, Cost-Benefit Analysis and the NationalEnvironmental Policy Act of 1969,

24

STAN.

L. REV. 1092, 1102-11 (1972).

209. See generally A. DowNs, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 237, 242 (1967) ("[n]o decision
making procedure can meet the standard of 'full good faith consideration' if the ultimate
deciding authority is committed in advance to one course of action"); Evolving Judicial
Standards,supra note 206, at 1626-27.
210. 115 Cong. Rec. 29053 (1969) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
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mentation of NEPA is necessary.
It has been suggested by one commentator that if a court
finds that an agency cannot comply with, the NEPA standard of
"full good faith consideration of environmental standards" in its
preparation and consideration of an environmental impact statement relating to a given project, then the court should remand
the decision to Congress."' Such a situation could arise upon a
court's finding that sufficiently definitive estimates of environmental cost are not possible or that a meaningful evaluation of
the benefits and alternatives cannot be undertaken.
By passing the National Environmental Policy Act, Congress,
inter alia, established a policy designed to rationalize environmental decision-making by requiring, without exception, that
all "major Federal action significantly affecting the . . environment" can only be taken after thorough consideration of
their environmental consequences. Obviously, only Congress
can authorize exceptions to its own inclusive policies."'
This concept of a remand to the Congress as a remedy for
environmental litigation would assure that the courts do not
make public policy, but that public policy is made by the proper
entity. 213
Since NEPA's inception nearly six years ago, courts have
witnessed a reluctant bureaucracy learning to comply with the
procedural requirements of NEPA. Time and trial by error have
illuminated the path to procedural compliance with the Act. In
order to assure that agencies comply with both the form and the
substance of NEPA, courts must closely scrutinize agency decisionmaking and require strict compliance with the procedural
commands of NEPA, as well as review agency decisions on the
211. Evolving JudicialStandards,supra note 206, at 1631.
212. Id, at 1631, (footnotes omitted) quoting NEPA § 102(2)(C), 42 U.S.C. §
4332(2)(C) (1971). The following factors were listed as criteria for determining what federal actions might be subject to a remand disposition in NEPA litigation:
(1) The extent to which the project is committed to administrative discretion; (2) the magnitude of the environmental damage risked by the project; (3)
the size of the project; (4) the sophistication of existing environmental and
economic knowledge regarding the cost and benefit issues the project raises; (5)
the quantum of agency time and money spent in attempting to comply with
NEPA; (6) the number of insufficient impact statements issued and; (7) the
extent of "bad faith" procedures used in evaluating the impact statement and
the project.
213. Evolving JudicialStandards,supra note 206, at 1637. See J. SAX, DEFENDING THE
ENVIRONMENT 175-92 (1971).
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265

merits. Otherwise the irrevocability of environmental degradation will serve as a permanent reminder of our failure to protect
our irreplaceable natural resources.
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